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ARTICLES
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS
IN MASSACHUSETTS STATE AND FEDERAL
COURTS
ARTHUR D. WOLF *
ABSTRACT
Concurrent jurisdiction frequently allows attorneys the choice of
filing a complaint in state or federal court. State courts presumptively
have jurisdiction over claims rooted in federal law. At times, state
courts are required to entertain federal claims. Similarly, federal courts
have authority over state claims because of diversity, federal question,
and supplemental jurisdiction. Many claims are rooted in both state and
federal law, such as antitrust, civil rights, environmental, consumer
protection, and civil liberties. Confronted with the choice of state or
federal court, the attorney must evaluate a variety of factors before
deciding in which court to file.
In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction,
the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of
the motion for temporary relief. The reason is simple: state and federal
courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary
motions. Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different
standards, although some courts have indicated to the contrary. In the
*
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federal courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the
complex Erie/Hanna doctrine. State courts may be similarly bound
by the much less well known “reverse-Erie” doctrine. Consequently, the
Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state
standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims.
This Article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in
Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend
their application. Part I provides background for the examination of
state and federal standards. Part II addresses the criteria for temporary
relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the
comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts. Part IV
inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief
in the federal courts. The Article concludes with the author's
observations about the issues raised.
INTRODUCTION
Attorneys frequently have the choice of filing a complaint in state
or federal court because of concurrent jurisdiction. State courts
presumptively have jurisdiction over claims rooted in federal law.1 At
times, state courts are required to entertain federal claims. 2 Similarly,
federal courts have authority over state claims because of diversity,
federal question, and supplemental jurisdiction. 3 Many claims are
rooted in both state and federal law, such as antitrust, civil rights,
environmental, consumer protection, and civil liberties. Confronted with
the choice of state or federal court, the attorney must evaluate a variety
of factors before deciding in which court to file.
In a civil action where the plaintiff seeks a preliminary injunction,
the selection of a state or federal court may determine the success of the
motion for temporary relief. The reason is simple: state and federal
courts frequently apply differing standards to such preliminary motions.
The Massachusetts state and federal courts apply different standards,
although some courts have indicated to the contrary. 4 In the federal
courts, the matter of differing standards is compounded by the complex
Erie/Hanna doctrine. 5 The state courts may be similarly bound by the

1. See Taflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990).
2. See Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
3. See discussion infra Part I.
4. See Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 160 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1998); see
also discussion infra Part II.
5. See infra Part IV.
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much less well known “reverse-Erie” doctrine. 6 Consequently, the
Massachusetts federal and state courts may be required to apply state
standards to state claims and federal standards to federal claims.
This article explores the standards for preliminary injunctions in
Massachusetts state and federal courts, and the intricacies that attend
their application. Part I provides background for the examination of
state and federal standards. Part II addresses the criteria for temporary
relief in the Massachusetts state courts, while Part III reviews the
comparable standards in the Massachusetts federal courts. Part IV
inquires into the Erie/Hanna doctrine as it applies to preliminary relief
in the federal courts. The Article concludes with the author's
observations about the issues raised.
I.

BACKGROUND

In 1980, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) decided
Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney, which announced new and
definitive standards for the issuance of preliminary injunctions. 7 In its
winter 2007 issue, the Massachusetts Law Review published Attorney
Cameron F. Kerry’s assessment of twenty-five years of state court
decisions under the regime of Packaging Industries. 8 He concluded that
the SJC’s decision and the cases that followed “establish[ed] the
preliminary injunction as one of the most important and useful remedies
in the kit of tools available to modern courts.” 9
In sharp contrast, the United States Supreme Court did not establish
clear, firm standards for preliminary injunctions until November, 2008.
In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 10 the Court finally
announced definitive criteria for the granting or denial of preliminary
injunctions. 11 Adopting a four-part test, familiar to readers of First
Circuit decisions, the Court purported to rest upon prior precedents for
this four-criteria approach. 12 In fact, it had never expressly and clearly
6. See, e.g., Dice v. Akron, Canton & Youngstown R.R., 342 U.S. 359 (1952). The
“reverse-Erie” doctrine, where a state court may be required to follow federal procedural rules
in enforcing federal rights, is not discussed in this Article. See generally Kevin M. Clermont,
Reverse-Erie, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1 (2006).
7. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 111-12 (Mass. 1980).
8. Cameron F. Kerry, Unpacking the Massachusetts Preliminary Injunction Standard,
90 MASS. L. REV. 160 (2007).
9. Id. at 178.
10. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
11. Over the years, the courts have used the words “preliminary,” “temporary,”
“interlocutory,” and “provisional” to describe interim injunctive relief. This Article will use
these words interchangeably.
12. Winter, 555 U.S. at 20; e.g., Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-12
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so ruled in unmistakable language. At least the lower federal courts did
not think so. 13
Finally, the question has arisen whether a federal court must apply
state standards for preliminary relief when the moving party’s claims are
based on state law. Although the Supreme Court has not addressed this
issue in the context of preliminary injunctions, it has given some
guidance in a series of cases beginning with its landmark ruling in Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 14 Because Massachusetts state and federal
standards for interlocutory injunctions differ, the application of the Erie
doctrine to motions for preliminary relief for state claims in federal court
is critical.
This Article will focus on the decisions in the Massachusetts state
and federal courts addressing the issue of interlocutory injunctive relief,
including the conflict between state and federal law when litigating in
federal court. After consideration of certain preliminary matters, the
Article will address the standards the state courts have adopted for
preliminary relief. The next section will address the federal decisions,
focusing on the United States Supreme Court and the First Circuit Court
of Appeals. The analysis will then proceed to examine the conflicts that
arise between federal and state standards under the Erie doctrine,15
peculiarly a product of litigation in the federal courts involving state law
claims. The question is whether state or federal standards should apply
to motions for preliminary injunctions when the underlying claim is
state-based. A conclusion follows this last section.
Since the early days of the Commonwealth and of the Republic, the
preliminary injunction has enjoyed a long and sometimes distinguished
career in American law, state and federal. It is one of the most important
tools at the disposal of attorneys. The preliminary injunction is used in a
wide variety of circumstances: to prevent an imminent merger and
acquisition; to enforce covenants not to compete; to restrain the violation
of civil rights and civil liberties; to prevent domestic abuse; to resolve
property and zoning disputes; to address rights of school children in a
variety of settings; and to advance a myriad of other claims.
When seeking a preliminary injunction, the litigant must comply
with a variety of procedural and substantive requirements. This Article

(1982).
13. See generally Arthur D. Wolf, Preliminary Injunctions: The Varying Standards, 7
W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 173 (1984).
14. 304 U.S. 70 (1938).
15. The Erie doctrine is a product of the landmark decision in Erie R.R. Co. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 70 (1938).
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will address only the substantive standards that determine whether the
court will issue a preliminary injunction. To the extent state and federal
law in Massachusetts differ, the Article will note such differences. The
SJC has stated: “[w]here the [Massachusetts] Legislature in enacting a
statute follows a Federal statute, we follow the adjudged construction of
the Federal statute by the Federal courts.” 16 The court has applied this
interpretative rule to the Massachusetts Rules of Civil Procedure, which
track for the most part the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 17
Assuming the litigant has complied with the procedural
prerequisites for obtaining a preliminary injunction, the litigant must
then persuade the court that it is entitled to the remedy sought. The
moving party has a heavy burden to demonstrate, factually and legally, it
is entitled to the “extraordinary” 18 remedy of injunction, although a
commentator on state court decisions has referred to it as “an ordinary
remedy” 19 in this Commonwealth. The Massachusetts state courts have
developed two lines of cases in determining whether a preliminary
injunction should issue. Similarly, the federal courts have developed
multiple standards for the issuance of such relief. Both the federal and
the state standards for preliminary injunctive relief will be addressed
here.
Before examining the applicable precedents, it is important to recall
the purpose for seeking a temporary injunction. Historically, the courts,
following the lead of their British counterparts, have identified the
preservation of the status quo as the object of interim relief. 20 One court
has stated that the status quo “is universally defined as the last
uncontested status which preceded the pending controversy.” 21 That
premise has two difficulties. First, the courts have struggled with
determining what constitutes the status quo, even given the “universal”
definition.
Second, in many instances, the party moving for preliminary relief
16. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 108 (Mass. 1980) (and
cases therein cited); accord, Scaccia v. State Ethics Commission, 727 N.E.2d 824, 828 (Mass.
2000); Mayo v. Key Fin. Servs., 678 N.E.2d 1311, 1313 (Mass. 1997).
17. Farley v. Sprague, 372 N.E.2d 1298, 1301 (Mass. 1978) (“absent compelling
reasons to the contrary”),
18. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 9 (2008); Weinberger v. RomeroBarcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944).
19. Kerry, supra note 8, at 178 (arguing that under state court precedents the
preliminary injunction today is an “ordinary remedy”).
20. See, e.g., Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and Woolen Co., 67 U.S. (2 Black)
545 (1862); Irwin v. Dixion, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 10 (1850).
21. Miss. Power & Light Co. v. United Gas Pipe Line Co., 609 F. Supp. 333, 343 (S.D.
Miss. 1984), aff’d, 760 F.2d 618 (5th Cir. 1985).
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does not want the status quo preserved. On the contrary, the movant
wants the court to order the opposing party to take mandatory or
affirmative action to alter the status quo, not simply to refrain from
engaging in a purported illegality. For example, if the plaintiffs, who
wish to protest peacefully without interference from hostile onlookers,
are seeking a preliminary injunction to secure police protection, they do
not want to preserve the status quo: assaults by hecklers while the police
do nothing. 22 They want the court to order the police to prevent violence
against them by opponents.
In recent years, the courts have recognized the inherent problems in
predicating interlocutory relief on maintaining the status quo.
Consequently, they have shifted the focus to preserving the subject
matter of the lawsuit so that the court will be able to grant effective relief
when the suit is resolved on the merits. “On the basis of [an
abbreviated] record, the moving party must show that, without the
requested relief, it may suffer a loss of rights that cannot be vindicated
should it prevail after a full hearing on the merits.” 23 This approach too
creates difficulties.
While preservation of the subject matter is the proper concern of
interim relief, the American legal system operates on the assumption that
individuals (natural and corporate) are free to act as they please until
they have been adjudged liable for injury to another. Interim relief is
inconsistent with this basic premise because it restricts freedom of action
without a final judgment of liability. 24 Further, “a preliminary
injunction must be granted or denied after an abbreviated presentation of
the facts and the law.” 25 In light of that reality, reconciling the need for
interim relief with the restriction on freedom that it imposes is the proper
focus of the search for appropriate criteria governing interlocutory
injunctions. Through the years, the state and federal courts have
explored a wide variety of responses to this tension.

22. See, e.g., Belknap v. Leary, 427 F.2d 496 (2d Cir. 1970).
23. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 111 (1980).
24. See Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999) (the Court refused to allow the injunctive remedy to prevent transfer of assets prior to a
judgment on the merits). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet:
Tradition, History, and Limitations on Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1291, 1320 n.161 (2000) (exploring fully the issues raised in Grupo).
25. Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 111.
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II. THE STATE COURTS
A. Overview
The Massachusetts state courts have developed two major lines of
cases in addressing motions for preliminary relief: the Packaging
Industries standards (hereinafter “traditional standards”) and the
“abbreviated” standards. The traditional standards require that the trial
court evaluate the parties’ likelihood of success on the merits in
combination with their irreparable harm, and then balance the irreparable
harm and the likelihood of success of both parties, granting the motion if
the balance tips in the direction of the moving party. 26 In this state, the
courts have also, on occasion, required the moving party to demonstrate
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction will not adversely affect
the “public interest” or will positively advance it. 27
The second line of cases requires the moving party to meet
“abbreviated standards” to secure a preliminary injunction. In civil
actions brought by the State Attorney General (or other governmental
unit) or by “private” attorneys general, the state courts require only that
the moving party demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits and
that the requested relief would be in the public interest. 28
B. Traditional Standards
The leading case for preliminary injunction standards in the state
courts is Packaging Industries Group, Inc. v. Cheney. 29 In Packaging
Industries, the plaintiffs brought suit to secure injunctive and monetary
relief from the defendant Cheney, a former vice-president of the plaintiff
companies. 30 The claims focused on certain business torts, including
unlawful use of trade secrets and breach of fiduciary duties. 31 The SJC,
in affirming the denial of an interlocutory injunction, identified a threestep analysis that a trial judge must undertake to determine whether a
preliminary injunction should be granted to the moving party. 32
First, the trial judge must evaluate “in combination the moving

26. See id. at 114.
27. See John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Mass.
1999) (internal citation omitted).
28. See Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983).
29. Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d 106. See generally Kerry, supra note 8 (exploring 25
years of state court decisions under Packaging Industries).
30. Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 108.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 111-12.
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party’s claim of injury [while the case is pending] and chance of success
on the merits.” 33 Second, if failure to issue the temporary order would
subject the movant “to a substantial risk of irreparable harm,” 34 the court
must then evaluate the injury to the non-moving party if the injunction is
granted together with its chance of succeeding on the merits. Third, the
court must now balance the risk of irreparable harm to the plaintiff
against the injury to the defendant if the injunction is granted or denied
with their respective chances of succeeding on the merits. The trial
court should issue the preliminary injunction if the balance “cuts in favor
of the moving party.” 35
The trial court’s evaluation of the impact of a grant or denial of
temporary relief pending a decision on the merits is the critical factor.
“It is the combination of likelihood of success and degree of irreparable
injury that matters.” 36 Further, in “an appropriate case,” the SJC has
directed trial judges to consider an additional factor: the benefits or the
“risk of harm to the public interest” if the preliminary injunction is
granted or denied. 37 In such cases, the trial court must determine
whether the public interest is promoted or adversely affected by the
grant or denial. Such harm to the public interest should be considered
when “the dispute does not involve [only] private parties.” 38The SJC has
defined “irreparable harm,” in the context of a motion for preliminary
relief, as the injury that may occur between the request for temporary
relief and a judgment on the merits. 39 “In the context of a preliminary
33. Id. at 112.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 114. Accord T & D Video, Inc. v. Revere, 670 N.E.2d 162, 165 (Mass. 1996);
Commonwealth v. Mass. CRINC, 466 N.E.2d 792, 797 (Mass. 1984). The SJC’s approach in
Packaging Industries is similar to the sliding scale approach that some federal courts of
appeals took prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter. See text infra Part III.B.3.
37. Town of Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983). Although the
SJC applied the three-factor Packaging Industries test, the following year it held that a
government party’s motion for a preliminary injunction need only satisfy a two-pronged test.
Cf. Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield, 178 N.E.2d 10 (Mass. 1961) (indicating that “public
interest” should be addressed when a governmental unit is the defendant in a suit for
injunctive relief).
38. See John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Mass.
1999). The “public interest” factor in determining preliminary relief should not be confused
with the “public interest” as an element of a substantive claim or defense. See Bank of New
England, N.A. v. Mortg. Corp. of New England, 567 N.E.2d 961, 966 (Mass. 1991); cf.
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass.
1990). See generally Kerry, supra note 8, at 169-73. The “public interest” as an element of a
claim or defense may enter the determination of a motion for a temporary injunction when the
court evaluates the parties’ chance of success under the Packaging Industries standards.
39. See Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 112 n.11.
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injunction the only rights which may be irreparably lost are those not
capable of vindication by a final judgment, rendered either at law or in
equity.” 40 In short, if no harm is likely to occur before a trial and
judgment on the merits, the moving party is not entitled to relief because
it has failed to show “irreparable” harm.
On occasion, the irreparable injury asserted involves
constitutionally protected rights, such as free speech. For example, in
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts, Inc. v. Operation Rescue,
the plaintiffs sued to enjoin the defendants from forcefully interfering,
largely through physical obstruction, with access to clinics performing
abortions. 41 Because pregnancies are time sensitive, the plaintiffs
prevailed on the question of irreparable harm against the defendants’
defense based on the First Amendment (here, freedom of speech and
assembly). 42
In rejecting the defendants’ assertion, the SJC ruled that the risk of
irreparable injury must be assessed at the time of the hearing on the
preliminary injunction. 43 At that point, the trial court has not yet
formulated an injunctive decree, so the alleged irreparable harm is
somewhat speculative. “[T]he defendants are not entitled to assume that
the judge will issue an injunction which deprives them of their right to
free expression.” 44 Indeed the trial court’s obligation is to craft an
injunctive order that carefully separates lawful from unlawful activities,
enjoining only the second. Once the preliminary injunction is entered,
the defendants may raise again their First Amendment rights,
challenging the constitutionality of the order. Indeed in Planned
Parenthood, the SJC addressed the impact of the decree from a First
Amendment point of view. 45
In sharp contrast, when a party has shown that its First Amendment
rights are already in jeopardy because of past actions by the government,
irreparable injury is presumed. For example, in T & D Video, Inc. v.
Revere, an adult video store sued the City of Revere to enjoin it from
enforcing zoning ordinances that, in effect, would prevent the video

40. Id.; see also OWEN M. FISS & DOUG RENDLEMEN, INJUNCTIONS 59 (2nd ed. 1984).
In the context of a request for a permanent injunction, “irreparable harm” means that the
moving party does not have an adequate remedy at law, ordinarily damages.
41. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc. v. Operation Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361
(Mass. 1990).
42. Id. at 1371.
43. Id. at 1369.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 1369-71.
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store from opening for business. 46 In affirming the issuance of a
preliminary injunction against Revere, the SJC first found that the
plaintiff had demonstrated a “likelihood of success on the merits” 47 of its
First Amendment claim. Having so ruled, the court held that irreparable
injury to the plaintiff followed as a matter of law, citing federal court
precedents. 48
Finally, as noted above, in “appropriate” cases, the SJC has directed
trial judges to consider an additional factor: the “risk of harm to the
public interest” if the preliminary injunction is granted or denied. 49
Such harm to the public interest should be considered when “the dispute
does not involve [only] private parties.” 50 Thus the courts will examine
the “public interest” criterion where a governmental unit, state or local,
is the defendant in a civil action.51 In such cases, the trial court must
first evaluate the traditional standards articulated in the Packaging
Industries case. Then the court must examine the “public interest” to
determine whether the grant or denial of the preliminary injunction will
promote or adversely affect such an interest.
In short, the moving party must demonstrate that it has satisfied the
traditional standards the SJC identified in the Packaging Industries
case. 52 If the defendant is a public body, the movant must show
additionally that the issuance of the temporary injunction will promote

46. 670 N.E.2d 162, 164 (Mass. 1996).
47. Id. at 166. See A.M.F., Ltd. v. City of Medford, 704 N.E.2d 184 (Mass. 1999)
(recognizing that in a First Amendment case, the defendant city has the burden to show the
constitutionality of the ordinance restricting speech in determining whether the moving party
has shown a likelihood of success on the merits).
48. T & D Video, 670 N.E.2d at 166. E.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (“The loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal periods of
time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable injury.”); see also Cirelli v. Town of Johnston
School District, 885 F. Supp. 663 (D.R.I. 1995). In Cirelli, the plaintiff teacher sued to enjoin
her school’s directive that she not videotape unsafe and unhealthy conditions to which her
students were exposed. Id. at 664. After the plaintiff demonstrated she was likely to succeed
on the merits of her First Amendment claim, the federal district court concluded that
irreparable injury would be presumed. Id. at 668. Although the Cirelli holding involved a
request for a temporary restraining order, the issue of irreparable injury overlaps with
preliminary relief.
49. Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983); see Landry v. Attorney
Gen., 709 N.E.2d 1085, 1090 (Mass. 1999).
50. See John T. Callahan & Sons, Inc. v. City of Malden, 713 N.E.2d 955, 960 (Mass.
1999).
51. Id.; see Siemens Bldg. Techs., Inc. v. Div. of Capital Asset Mgmt., 791 N.E.2d 340,
345 (Mass. 2003); Tri-Nel Mgt., Inc. v. Bd. of Health of Barnstable, 741 N.E.2d 37, 40 (Mass.
2001); Landry, 709 N.E.2d at 1090.
52. Packaging Indus. Grp. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 112 (Mass. 1980).
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the public interest, or alternatively, that it will not adversely affect it. 53
Since the moving party must demonstrate that all factors favor issuance
of the injunction, the state courts usually begin with an examination of
whether the moving party is likely to succeed on the merits. 54 If that
party fails to show the likelihood of prevailing on the merits, the
appellate court, at least, will end their inquiry. 55 Trial courts, however,
ordinarily address all criteria in the event the appellate court disagrees in
its assessment of the standards, thus allowing the appellate court to
direct the issuance or denial of the temporary injunction. 56
C. Abbreviated Standards
The state courts have also developed a second line of cases,
applying abbreviated standards for the grant of a preliminary injunction.
These cases are limited to civil actions commenced by a governmental
entity 57 or a citizen “acting as a private attorney general to enforce a
statute or a declared policy of the Legislature.” 58 In abbreviating the
traditional standards, the courts only require that the moving party
demonstrate: (1) “a likelihood of success on the merits”; 59 and (2) that
the “requested relief would be in the public interest.” 60
The state courts have applied these abbreviated standards in two
types of cases: where the plaintiff is “the government or a citizen acting
as a private attorney general.” 61 In these cases, the plaintiff, in moving
for a preliminary injunction, does not have to show irreparable injury or
that a balancing of the harms favors the moving party, although the SJC
in LeClair suggested that any harm to the plaintiff would be subsumed
in the evaluation of the public interest factor.62
This line of cases apparently began with Commonwealth v. Mass.
53. See Cote-Whitacre v. Dep’t of Public Health, 844 N.E.2d 623, 634-35 (Mass.
2006); Loyal Order of Moose v. Bd. of Health of Yarmouth, 790 N.E.2d 203, 206-07 (Mass.
2003); Healey v. Comm’r of Pub. Welfare, 605 N.E.2d 279, 285 (Mass. 1992).
54. Fordyce v. Town of Hanover, 929 N.E.2d 929 (Mass. 2010).
55. Id.; Wilson v. Comm’r of Transitional Assistance, 809 N.E.2d 524 (Mass. 2004);
Siemens, 791 N.E.2d 340; Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 111-12.
56. Wilson, 809 N.E.2d at 528-29.
57. E.g., Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548, 550 (Mass. 2008)
(state government); Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Mass. 1983) (local
government).
58. LeClair v. Town of Norwell, 719 N.E.2d 464, 468 (Mass. 1999); accord Edwards v.
Boston, 562 N.E.2d 834, 837 (Mass. 1990).
59. LeClair, 719 N.E.2d at 468.
60. Id.
61. Id.; accord Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d at 550.
62. LeClair, 719 N.E.2d at 472-73.

WOLF FINAL 51313

12

7/13/2013 12:58 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

CRINC. 63 In this case, the Attorney General brought suit to enforce the
anti-trust and “bottle bill” laws against defendant beer distributors and a
beer container recycling company. 64 After a hearing, the trial court
entered a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from
violating the antitrust law and the bottle bill. 65 The order contained both
prohibitory and affirmative provisions.66 On appeal, the defendants
contended that the trial court failed to apply the tripartite test of
Packaging Industries. 67
After reciting the three-step test articulated in Packaging Industries,
the SJC agreed that the trial judge failed to apply the irreparable injury
and balancing tests of Packaging Industries. 68 The court further held,
however, that the Packaging Industries standards apply to suits between
private parties. 69 They are inapplicable to suits by the Attorney General
because he is acting pursuant to “his broad common law and statutory
powers to represent the public interest.” 70 These powers may rest on
general statutory authority, e.g., G. L. c. 12, § 10, specific statutory
authority, e.g., G. L. c. 93, §§ 8, 9, 12, and 13, or on “a common law
duty.” 71
The SJC has extended the CRINC holding to civil actions by private
persons who are suing in the capacity of a “private” attorney general.
For example, in LeClair, 72 the plaintiffs, ten taxpayers, sued the town
alleging it violated state and local law in choosing vendors to conduct a
feasibility study for the construction of a new public school, and to
design the school if the study gave the green light. 73
In LeClair, the SJC first noted that the traditional standards for
awarding preliminary injunctive relief would not apply since the

63. Commonwealth v. Mass. CRINC, 466 N.E.2d 792 (Mass. 1984). Shortly before its
decision in Mass. CRINC, the SJC applied the three-step test of Packaging Industries in a civil
action initiated by the Attorney General, Commonwealth v. County of Suffolk, 418 N.E. 2d
1234 (Mass. 1981), and by a local government. Brookline v. Goldstein, 447 N.E.2d 641, 644
(Mass. 1983). In dictum, the court noted that in “appropriate” cases the public interest would
be considered.
64. Mass. CRINC, 466 N.E.2d at 796.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 797.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 798. In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on United States v.
D’Annolfo, 474 F. Supp. 220, 222 (D. Mass. 1979).
71. Id.
72. LeClair v. Town of Norwell, 719 N.E.2d 464 (Mass. 1999).
73. Id. at 466.
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plaintiffs brought the suit in their capacity as “private attorneys
general.” 74 The plaintiffs acquired this status because they were suing
under c. 40, § 53 of the General Laws, the statute authorizing ten
taxpayers to enjoin local officials who unlawfully “are about to raise or
expend money or incur obligations.” 75
In such circumstances, the private attorneys general (i.e., the
taxpayers), in moving for a temporary injunction, need only show a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits and that the public interest
supports the injunction. In these suits, the SJC has applied the
abbreviated standards in favor of private attorneys general even though
the defendant is a governmental unit, which ordinarily would require the
moving party to satisfy the traditional standards of Packaging Industries
plus the public interest factor noted earlier.
To date, the state courts have attached the “private attorney
general” label to only a limited number of lawsuits, which allow the
party moving for a preliminary injunction to utilize the CRINC twopronged test. The classic cases have involved sections of the General
Laws authorizing suits by a certain number of taxpayers. 76 Presumably
the courts would apply the same two-pronged test for preliminary relief
to taxpayer suits under still other provisions of the General Laws, such
as G.L. c. 35, § 35 (“one or more taxable inhabitants” of a county may
sue to enforce laws regulating county accounts and finances); G.L. c. 44,
§ 59 (“one or more taxable inhabitants” may sue to enforce laws
regulating municipal finances and debt); and G.L. c. 164, § 69 (20
taxable inhabitants of a city or town may sue to enforce laws regulating
municipal generation of electric or gas).
Recently, the Massachusetts Appeals Court in dictum described
another category of civil actions where the private attorney general
doctrine could apply. In Carroll v. Marzilli, 77 the court rejected the
plaintiffs’ argument that their motion for a preliminary injunction should
be measured by the abbreviated standards applicable to private attorneys
general. 78 The court held that the statute under which the plaintiffs sued
did not authorize them to represent anyone other than themselves. 79
Their statutory claims were strictly private, not implicating the public
74. Id. at 468.
75. MASS. GEN. LAWS. ch. 40, § 53; see also Edwards v. Boston, 562 N.E.2d 834
(Mass. 1990) (local taxpayers’ suit under MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 40, § 53).
76. See Natick Auto Sales Inc. v. Dep’t of Procurement & Gen. Servs., 715 N.E.2d 84,
85 (Mass. App. Ct. 1999) (twenty-four state taxpayer suit under G.L. c. 29, § 63).
77. Carroll v. Marzilli, 915 N.E.2d 268 (Mass. App. Ct. 2009).
78. Id. at 271.
79. Id. at 272.
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interest.
The appeals court suggested, however, that if a statute authorizes
the plaintiff to represent other injured persons, as well as itself; the
plaintiff could be cast into the role of a private attorney general. 80 In
such instances, the abbreviated standards for preliminary relief would be
available.
The court offered two examples of such statutory
authorization: G.L. c 149, § 105A (employee may represent himself and
“other employees similarly situated”), and G.L. c. 151, § 1B (injured
party may represent himself and “others similarly situated”).81 The court
did not indicate whether the “private attorney general” doctrine would
extend to any class action under Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.
Beyond these taxpayer and class action-type suits, the state courts
will probably tread very lightly in applying the CRINC two-pronged test
to private attorney general civil actions. The appeals court, though, has
suggested that a single private plaintiff could, in effect, serve as the
surrogate for a public agency in an appropriate case.82 In this instance,
however, the appeals court did not apply to that suggestion the
abbreviated standards for securing a preliminary injunction. It did,
however, apply the suggestion to the issue whether a judge, in granting a
preliminary injunction, could award to the moving party “the ultimate
relief” the party seeks after judgment on the merits,83 much as it would if
a government agency were the moving party.
Furthermore, the appeals court has indicated that “[t]he public
interest” might be a factor in strictly private litigation when a party seeks
preliminary relief. 84 It stated that the “public interest may also be
considered in a case between private parties where the applicable
substantive law involves issues that concern public interest.” 85 The
“public interest” factor in determining preliminary relief should not be
confused, however, with the “public interest” as an element of a
substantive claim or defense. Nonetheless, the “public interest” as an
element of a claim or defense may enter the determination of a motion
for a temporary injunction when the court evaluates the parties’ chances

80. Id. at 271-72.
81. Id.
82. See Petricca Constr. Co. v. Commonwealth, 640 N.E. 2d 780 (Mass. App. Ct.
1994).
83. Id. at 785.
84. See Bank of New England, N.A. v. Mortgage Corp. of New England, 567 N.E.2d
961, 966 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991); cf. Planned Parenthood League of Mass., Inc., v. Operation
Rescue, 550 N.E.2d 1361 (Mass. 1990). See generally Kerry, supra note 8, at 169-173.
85. See Bank of New England, 567 N.E.2d at 966. See generally Kerry, supra note 8, at
169-70.
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of success under the Packaging Industries standards.
Under Massachusetts’s decisional law, tension exists between the
four-step approach (which includes the public interest) for preliminary
relief when a governmental unit is the defendant and the decisions
allowing a private attorney general to demonstrate only two factors for a
temporary injunction in suits against governmental units. When a
private party commences a civil action (perhaps even as a class action
under Rule 23) against a governmental unit, it must satisfy the standards
of Packaging Industries/CRINC to obtain a temporary injunction. In
sharp contrast, if that private party sues a governmental entity as a
“private attorney general,” its burden is reduced considerably to the twofactor test of LeClair. To date, the SJC does not appear to have
addressed specifically this tension between the two lines of cases.
III. THE FEDERAL COURTS
A. Overview
The first case of any substance in the United States Supreme Court
involved a preliminary injunction. In Georgia v. Brailsford, 86 Georgia
invoked the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to enjoin
temporarily the execution of a money judgment previously entered by
the United States Circuit Court 87 for the District of Georgia. In that
prior suit, Brailsford and others, who were British subjects, recovered
the judgment based on a debt owed them by a citizen of Georgia. 88
In 1782, Georgia enacted a law that confiscated all debts owed to
British subjects, making the state the beneficiary of such obligations.89
The debt to British subjects was largely a product of the Revolutionary
War. During the pendency of the earlier private suit in the Federal
Circuit Court between the American debtors and the British creditors,
Georgia sought to intervene to assert its rights under the confiscation
law. 90 When the federal judge denied the intervention motion, 91 Georgia
86. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792) (the caption in the official report misspelled the
defendant’s name as “Braislford”). The Court decided Brailsford six months before the
celebrated case of Chisholm v. Georgia. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (involving state sovereign
immunity).
87. From 1789 until 1911, two federal courts had trial responsibilities: the district court
and the circuit court, which, except for one year between 180l and 1802, did not have its own
judges. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND
THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 21-22, 28-30 (6th ed. 2009).
88. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 404.
89. Id. at 402-03.
90. Id. at 404.
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instituted an original suit against Brailsford and other British creditors in
the Supreme Court of the United States. 92
To protect its asserted right to the money judgment pending a
decision on the merits in the Supreme Court, Georgia moved for a
temporary injunction to stay the proceedings in the circuit court and to
restrain the marshal from paying over to the Brailsford plaintiffs any of
the proceeds on the judgment. 93 In a 4-2 decision, 94 including Justice
Iredell, 95 the Court granted the injunction pending disposition of the case
on the merits. 96 Because each of the Justices stated his views in seriatim
opinions (a practice that did not last long in the Court), it is difficult to
articulate a holding in the case. Justices Cushing and Johnson 97
dissented on the grounds that Georgia had an adequate remedy at law, 98
a defense to equity suits mandated by Section 16 of the Judiciary Act of
1789. 99
At the next term of the Court in 1793, the defendants moved to
dissolve the injunction on alternative grounds: (1) the State of Georgia
had no remedy at all; and (2) even if it did, Section l6 barred the
injunction because of the adequacy of the legal remedy. 100 With Justice
Johnson not sitting, the Court denied the motion to dissolve. 101 In a
three-sentence opinion, Chief Justice Jay held that, even though the
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 405.
94. In 1792, the Court had five associate Justices and the Chief Justice.
95. Although Justice Iredell sat in the Circuit Court in the suit between Brailsford and
Spaulding, he nonetheless rendered an opinion which he stated was “detached from every
previous consideration of the merits of the cause.” Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 406. Section
47 of Title 28 arguably forbids such a practice today: “No judge shall hear or determine an
appeal from the decision of a case or issue tried by him.” 28 U.S.C. § 47 (2006).
96. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 406-09.
97. Id. at 405, 408 (Cushing, J. & Johnson, J., dissenting). Many years later, lower
federal courts, with or without citation, quoted or paraphrased Justice Johnson’s statement in
dissent: “In order to support a motion for an injunction, the bill should set forth a case of
probable right, and a probable danger that the right would be defeated, without this special
interposition of the court.” Id.; e.g., Lundgrin v. Claytor, 619 F.2d 61, 63 (l0th Cir. 1980)
(citing Crowther v. Seaborg, 415 F.2d 437, 439 (l0th Cir. 1969)).
98. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 405, 408.
99. Section l6 provided “[t]hat suits in equity shall not be sustained in either of the
courts of the United States, in any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be
had at law.” 1 Stat. 73 (1789). In 1948 when Congress revised the Judicial Code, it
eliminated this provision. See Herbert Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the
Judicial Code, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216 (1948).
100. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 415.
101. Id. at 419. In his separate opinion, Justice Blair identified apprehension that
Brailsford, a British subject, would take the money and run (to England) as the factor
animating the issuance of the original injunction. Id. at 418.
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plaintiff had an adequate remedy at law, the injunction would continue
because “the money ought to be kept [under the control of the Court] for
the party to whom it belongs.” 102 He did not identify any standards to
govern the issuance or continuation of preliminary injunctions.
In denying the defendants’ motion to dissolve the temporary
injunction, the Court conditioned the continuance of the injunction upon
Georgia commencing its action at law before the next term of the
Court. 103 The following year in 1794, the Supreme Court conducted a
jury trial in Georgia v. Brailsford on the plaintiff's claim under the
Georgia confiscation statute. 104 When the jury returned a verdict for the
defendants, the British creditors, the Court dissolved the temporary
injunction. 105
Since the 1792 decision in Georgia v. Brailsford, 106 the federal
courts have struggled with the standards to be applied to requests for
temporary injunctive relief. Until its 2008 decision in Winter v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 107 the Supreme Court had not definitively
stated the criteria for the issuance of preliminary injunctions. For the
most part, it had left the matter to the courts of appeals, which developed
a variety of standards. 108
English equity practice provided some guideposts in the nineteenth
century. At least as early as 1792, the Supreme Court by rule stated that
English equity practice would guide its proceedings. 109 Under the
Federal Equity Rules in effect from 1822 to 1912, the Supreme Court
directed the lower federal courts to employ the “practice of the High
Court of Chancery in England” to fill gaps in the law governing federal
equity jurisdiction. 110 In several nineteenth century decisions, the Court
absorbed the principles of the English Chancery into federal law. 111
The Equity Rules of l912 did not have a comparable reference to

102. Id. at 418-19.
103. Id. at 419.
104. Georgia v. Brailsford, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 1 (1794).
105. Id. at 5.
106. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).
107. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
108. See generally Wolf, supra note 13, at 173.
109. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 411-14. Fifty years later, Supreme Court Reporter
Benjamin C. Howard reported that rule, in slightly different form, as having been promulgated
a year earlier on August 8, 1791. 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxiv (1842).
110. See Rule 33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) vii, xiii (1822); Rule 90, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxxix,
lxix (1842).
111. See, e.g., Penn. v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 56364 (1856); Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222-23 (1818).
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the English law of equity. 112 Much more recently, though, the Court, in
2008, restated the proposition that the law of equity, including
preliminary injunctions, in the federal courts is guided by the equitable
principles extant in England. 113 Sometimes it has referred specifically to
the English High Court of Chancery at the time of the ratification of the
Constitution in 1788 and the passage of the Judiciary Act in 1789. 114
Notwithstanding the references to English equity, the federal courts soon
began developing their own criteria to govern motions for interlocutory
injunctions.
In their quest for appropriate standards, the Supreme Court and the
courts of appeals have not followed consistent paths through the maze of
interlocutory relief. The federal appellate courts have not been
especially attentive to Supreme Court decisions, and the Court itself has
not been especially attentive to the need for uniform criteria.
B. Supreme Court Decisions
Prior to the 2008 decision in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 115 the opinions of the Supreme Court regarding the standards
for issuing preliminary injunctions could be described as inattentive.
Although the Court has reviewed many orders granting or denying
preliminary injunctions, 116 it has not established hard and fast rules
regarding their issuance. On the occasions when the court has addressed
the criteria, it has done so somewhat casually and largely without regard
for the varying standards followed by the lower federal courts and
indeed by the Court itself. Furthermore, the Court has not used its prior
precedents regularly in developing standards. This casualness perhaps
accounts for the reality that the lower federal courts, prior to Winter,
have barely given nodding recognition to the Supreme Court opinions
regarding interlocutory injunctions. At best, the Supreme Court
precedents have served as points of departure for federal appellate
decisions, which quickly move in other directions.
1.

Early Precedents

After the 1792 decision in Brailsford, the Supreme Court said very
112. 226 U.S. 629 (1912).
113. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691 (2008).
114. Grupo Mexico de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318
(1999).
115. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
116. In the past 15 years, the Supreme Court has reviewed over 100 civil actions
involving preliminary injunctions. It has explored the parameters of the standards for such
relief in only seven of them.
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little about the standards for preliminary injunctions 117 until 1882, when
the Court broke its 90-year silence. In Russell v. Farley, the Court in
dictum commented on the criteria for issuing temporary injunctions. 118
It noted that a federal court might order interim relief even if the
movant’s claim is legally in doubt. 119 Where the movant’s legal right is
doubtful, she may still secure a temporary injunction by showing that
she will suffer greater harm if the injunction is denied than the opposing
party will suffer if it is granted. 120
In support of this legal proposition, the Court cited Injunctions in
Equity (1871), a popular treatise by William W. Kerr, a British
lawyer. 121 The treatise largely examined English precedents on which
the Supreme Court relied in the nineteenth century. 122 Indeed the
Supreme Court still relies on English equity practice, 123 including
principles extant at the time of the adoption of the Constitution in 1788
and the enactment of the first Judiciary Act in 1789. 124
Although the statement in Russell was dictum, it appears to reflect
accurately then current standards for preliminary injunctions. 125 That is,
117. In several cases, the Court, without discussing applicable standards, approved the
issuance of temporary injunctions, as in Brailsford, to preserve property until an action at law
could settle the dispute on the merits, e.g., King v. Hamilton, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 311 (1830);
Parker v. Judges of the Circuit Court of Md., 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 561 (1827); or to restrain
execution of a judgment at law pending resolution of an equitable defense, e.g., Horsburg v.
Baker, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 232 (1828). In Parker v. Winnipiseogee Lake Cotton and Woolen Co.,
67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 545, 552 (1863), a case involving a permanent or “perpetual” injunction, the
Court stated in dictum that the party seeking preliminary relief to preserve property pending
trial of a civil action at law would have to show “a strong prima facie case of right” and
irreparable injury.
118. Russell v. Farley, 105 U.S. 433, 439 (1881).
119. Id. at 438 (nothing that the court is reluctant to take a course which may injure
either party when the claim is legally doubtful).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 438-39.
122. At least as early as 1792, the Supreme Court by rule stated that English equity
practice would guide its proceedings. See Case of Hayburn, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792).
Under the Federal Equity Rules in effect from 1822 to 1912, the Supreme Court directed the
lower federal courts to employ the “practice of the High Court of Chancery in England” to fill
gaps in the law governing federal equity jurisdiction. See Rule 33, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) v, xiii
(1822); Rule 90, 42 U.S. (1 How.) xxxix, lxix (1842). The equity rules of l912 did not have a
comparable rule. 226 U.S. 629 (19l2).
123. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 691 (2008) (applying England’s practice as a
reason for its ruling in another case).
124. See Grupo Mexico de Desarrollo, S.A. v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308,
318 (1999).
125. See J. HIGH, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 13 (Chicago, Callaghan
& Co. 1873); CHARLES F. BEACH JR., COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF INJUNCTIONS § 20
(n.p. 1894); see generally John Leubsdorf, The Standards for Preliminary Injunctions, 91
HARV. L. REV. 525 (1978); Note, Developments in the Law—Injunctions, 78 HARV. L. REV.
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if the movant could demonstrate a clear legal right, “plain and free from
doubt,” 126 the injunction would issue. In the alternative, if the legal right
were in doubt, then the movant would have to show a balance of
hardships in her favor. 127 The Kerr treatise, however, also reflected a
second alternative standard for preliminary relief: (1) a showing of a
prima facie case; and (2) a showing of irreparable injury, that is, an
injury that cannot be remedied with money damages. 128 Neither Russell
nor other Supreme Court precedents in the nineteenth century reflected
this second alternative test for issuance of preliminary injunctions.
The application of the second alternative test emerged definitively
in the early part of the twentieth century in the wake of Ex parte
Young. 129 The Young decision restated the view that state officials could
be sued to enjoin enforcement of state statutes without violating state
sovereign immunity from suit in federal court embodied in the Eleventh
amendment. 130 That decision animated a number of suits challenging
state regulatory statutes as violating the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. 131
In the wake of the Young decision, Congress enacted the threejudge court statute, which sought to prevent a single federal judge from
enjoining state regulatory statutes. 132 Because decisions granting or
denying preliminary injunctions were appealable directly to the Supreme
Court, the high tribunal had numerous opportunities to review the
standards for interlocutory relief.
In the Young case, as well as in the decisions following it, the
Supreme Court held that preliminary injunctions should not issue to
restrain the enforcement of state statutes unless the case was “reasonably
free from doubt” and only to prevent “great and irreparable injury.” 133
994 (1965).
126. WILLIAM W. KERR, A TREATISE ON THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF INJUNCTIONS IN
EQUITY 220 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co. 1871); see also Phoenix Ry. Co. v. Geary, 239
U.S. 277 (1915) (stating that to enjoin preliminarily the operation of a state statute, the
plaintiff must show a clear constitutional violation).
127. See KERR, supra note 126 at 221-22.
128. Id. at 208. See generally Leubsdorf, supra note 125 at 530-31.
129. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (l908).
130. Id. at 159-60.
131. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 7.5.1 (Aspen 6th ed. 2012);
see also WRIGHT AND KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 48 (West 7th ed. 2011).
132. Act of June 18, 1910, Pub. L. No. 218, § 17, 36 Stat. 539, 557 (1910). In 1976
Congress largely repealed the three-judge district court statute.
133. Young, 209 U.S. at 166-67; accord, Mass. State Grange v. Benton, 272 U.S. 525,
527 (1926) (citing Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 (1919)); see Foster-Fountain
Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1, 5 (1928); see also Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands Canning
Co., 309 U.S. 310, 316-19 (1940).

WOLF FINAL 51313

2013]

7/13/2013 12:58 PM

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS

21

Although it appeared by the early 1920’s that the Court had settled on
these standards, it still exhibited some variation in its application. In
1923, relying on the Kerr treatise 134 once again, the Supreme Court, in a
challenge to a state rate-making order, upheld a preliminary injunction
because a balancing of the hardships favored the plaintiff and because
the moving party had posted a sufficient bond. 135
As the Court moved further into the twentieth century, it appeared
to be drawing a distinction between private cases and public cases. That
is, the Court would apply a stricter set of criteria for preliminary relief
when the plaintiff sought to enjoin governmental (state or federal) action
than when the litigation involved only private interests and private
parties. 136 The SJC has adopted this distinction in its decisions as well
although not with consistent standards. 137
In succeeding years, the Supreme Court continued its meandering
course through various tests and criteria, which, singularly or in
combination, could have formed the basis for a consistent standard for
issuing preliminary injunctions. In 1939, for example, the Court
emphasized, apparently for the first time, the need to evaluate the impact
of a preliminary injunction on the public interest where the plaintiff
seeks to enjoin an order of a federal agency. 138 That same year, in a case
challenging the validity of a state statute, the Court identified three
prerequisites for injunctive relief: grave doubts as to the constitutionality
of the statute; irreparable harm to the movant; and posting of a bond.139
It did not discuss the balancing of hardships or the public interest factors
noted in earlier cases.

134. KERR, supra note 126.
135. Prendergast v. New York Tel. Co., 262 U.S. 43 (1923). In 1934, Congress enacted
the Johnson Act to prevent the federal courts from unduly interfering in state rate-making.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006). In 1937, Congress enacted the Tax Injunction Act to prevent
the federal courts from unduly interfering in state tax collection. See 28 U.S.C. § 1341
(2006); see also Rosewell v. LaSalle Nat’l Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981).
136. Compare Young, 209 U.S. at 123 (suit to enjoin state action) with Rice & Adams
Corp. v. Lathrop, 278 U.S. 509 (1929) (private suit to enjoin patent infringement).
137. See infra Part II.C (discussing the “public interest” as a factor in preliminary
relief).
138. Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939). Two years earlier, the
Court had noted the relevance of the public interest in granting or withholding permanent
injunctive relief. Virginian Ry. Co. v. System Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
139. Gibbs v. Buck, 307 U.S. 66, 76-77, 94 (1939). See Mayo v. Lakeland Highlands
Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 318-19 (1940) (the Court in Mayo appeared to adopt two different
sets of criteria: one would allow a preliminary injunction if the movant showed irreparable
injury and raised “serious questions” regarding the constitutionality of the challenged statute,
while the other would require “a clear and persuasive showing of unconstitutionality and
irreparable injury”).
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Contemporary Standards

Until its November 2008 decision in Winter v. Natural Resources
Defense Council, 140 the Supreme Court, in recent years, has not done
much better to articulate consistent standards for the issuance of
preliminary injunctions. It provided very little guidance to the lower
federal courts through the adoption of consistent and uniform standards
for the issuance of preliminary injunctions. For example, over a period
of fifteen years, the Court had numerous opportunities to clarify the
standards for preliminary relief, but it failed to do so. 141
Between 1973 and 1975, for example, the Court discussed the
criteria for interlocutory relief in at least four different ways. In Brown
v. Chote, 142 the Court identified a two-factor test: the moving party must
show (1) the “possibilities” of success on the merits; and (2) the
“possibility” of irreparable injury if the relief is denied.143
The following year, the Court repeated the two-factor test, but
phrased it as a “likelihood of success on the merits,” and a “likelihood of
irreparable injury,” 144 not simply the "possibility.” 145 At its next term,
the Court added a third factor to the test for preliminary relief, but did
not apply it to the pending case. In addition to showing a likelihood of
success on the merits and irreparable injury, the trial court must also
“weigh carefully the interests on both sides.” 146 In these three cases, the
Court said nothing about the public interest.
In the fourth case in this span of three years, the Supreme Court
referred to the public interest factor, which it had earlier mentioned as an
element in evaluating the need for preliminary injunctions. 147 In
Sampson v. Murray, a probationary employee, who had been dismissed
from her job with a federal agency, successfully secured preliminary
relief from the district court pending a hearing before the Civil Service
140. 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
141. Between 1994 and 2009, the Supreme Court reviewed over 100 civil actions in this
span of 15 years, which involved varying standards for preliminary injunctions, discussing the
appropriate standards for temporary injunctive relief in only seven of them. Winter settled the
matter.
142. 411 U.S. 452 (1973); cf. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 45 (1975) (applying the
same two factors, although phrasing one as a “high” probability of success on the merits).
143. Brown, 411 U.S. at 456.
144. Granny Goose Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974).
145. In Winter, 555 U.S. at 22, the Court expressly rejected the “possibility” standard as
“too lenient,” holding that the correct standard is “likelihood” of success on the merits.
146. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).
147. Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974); see Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S.
414, 441-42 (1944); Inland Steel Co. v. United States, 306 U.S. 153, 157 (1939); Virginian
Ry. Co. v. Sys. Fed’n No. 40, 300 U.S. 515, 552 (1937).
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Commission. 148
In Sampson, the Court assumed the vitality of and apparently
adopted the four-factor test that the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit developed in Virginia Petroleum Jobbers Ass’n v.
Federal Power Commission: 149 (l) the moving party must make a strong
showing of likely success on the merits; (2) the petitioner must
demonstrate that, in the absence of the injunction, she will suffer
irreparable injury; (3) the movant must show that other parties interested
in the proceeding will not be substantially harmed by the injunction; and
(4) the public interest must be evaluated. 150 Because the case involved a
government personnel decision, the Court rejected the routine
application of these four factors on a motion for a preliminary
injunction, holding that such criteria, especially irreparable injury, must
be applied more stringently. 151 Despite the Supreme Court’s reference
to the four-factor test in Sampson, the courts of appeals continued to go
their own ways. 152
3.

The Winter Decision

In Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., the Court
finally focused on the criteria for the grant or denial of preliminary
injunctions. 153 There, the Natural Resources Defense Council sued to
enjoin the United States Navy from using “mid-frequency active sonar”
in the waters off Southern California. 154 It alleged that such sonar
caused serious harm to some species of marine mammals. 155 Using a
“sliding scale” approach it had used for many years, the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the grant of preliminary relief, ruling that the
plaintiff had made a strong showing on the likelihood of prevailing on
the merits and a “possibility” of irreparable harm. 156

148. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 63.
149. 259 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1958) (per curiam).
150. Sampson, 415 U.S. at 84 n.53.
151. Id. at 88-92.
152. See generally Wolf, supra note 13.
153. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 22-23 (2008).
154. Id. at 13-14.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 19-20. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals never referred to Granny Goose
Foods, Inc. v. Brotherhood of Teamsters, 415 U.S. 423, 441 (1974) or other prior Supreme
Court precedents that used the word “likelihood” rather than “possibility” to define the level
of showing needed to secure the preliminary injunction. This is another example of a lower
federal court ignoring precedents because the Court itself, until recently, had not paid detailed
and studious attention to the matter.
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The Supreme Court reversed the ruling of the Court of Appeals. 157
First, it noted that a temporary injunction is “an extraordinary remedy
never awarded as of right.” 158 Second, the Court added that a trial court
should grant preliminary relief only upon a “clear showing” that the
moving party is entitled to it.159 Third, the Court identified the four
factors the trial court must consider in evaluating requests for temporary
injunctions. 160 It ruled that the moving party “must establish that he is
likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer irreparable
harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips
in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.” 161 Although
the Court cited prior decisions 162 for this four-factor test, in fact it had
never expressly and clearly so ruled in unmistakable language prior to its
decision in Winter. At least the lower federal courts did not think so. 163
The Court then addressed the question whether it should affirm the
issuance of the preliminary injunction. First, it noted that the appellate
court had incorrectly required only a showing of “possible” irreparable
injury, which the Court noted is “too lenient.” 164 The correct standard is
“likelihood” of irreparable injury. It then ruled that the plaintiff had not
demonstrated the public interest would not be adversely affected. 165 In
fact, the Court observed, the national defense would be seriously
impaired, and courts should defer to the military’s assessment of the
dangers to the public interest if the injunction is granted. 166
When the non-moving party defendant is a government, the inquiry
into the harm to that party and the harm to the public interest is the same
inquiry because the government represents the public interest. 167
Finally, the Court declined to rule on the likelihood of success factor as

157. Winter, 555 U.S. at 33.
158. Id. at 24.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 22.
161. Id. at 20.
162. The Court cited Munaf v. Geren, 128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), Amoco Production Co. v.
Gambell, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987), and Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 31112 (1982).
163. See generally Wolf, supra note 13.
164. Winter, 555 U.S. at 22.
165. Id. at 26-27.
166. Id. at 27.
167. Id. at 26-31. Cf. Nken v. Holder, 129 S. Ct. 1749, 1761-62 (2009) (ruling on an
application for a stay pending appeal, the Court noted that the four “stay” factors are nearly
identical to the four criteria for preliminary injunctions, and the harm to the non-movant and
the public interest factors “merge when the Government is the opposing party”). This author
recommended such a merger 26 years ago. See generally Wolf, supra note 13.
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unnecessary because the plaintiff had failed to satisfy the other factors.
Whether the Court will apply this four-factor analysis, including the
public interest criterion, when none of the parties to the litigation is a
governmental entity remains to be seen, although the lower federal
courts have done so in the wake of Winter. 168
The Winter decision has already impacted the standards for
granting preliminary injunctions applied in the lower federal courts,
unlike prior Supreme Court decisions which seemed to have had little
effect on the development of the standards for temporary relief. For
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals began applying Winter
immediately, notwithstanding its prior criteria. “To the extent that our
cases have suggested a lesser standard, they are no longer controlling, or
even viable.” 169 Prior to Winter, the Ninth Circuit allowed the grant of a
preliminary injunction if the plaintiff demonstrated either:
(1) [A] likelihood of success on the merits and the possibility of
irreparable injury; or (2) that serious questions going to the merits
were raised and the balance of hardships tips sharply in its favor.
These two alternatives represent extremes of a single continuum,
rather than two separate tests. Thus, the greater the relative hardship
to the party seeking the preliminary injunction, the less probability
170
of success must be shown.

Winter dramatically altered these previous standards in the Ninth
Circuit and elsewhere. 171 Its full impact on the standards for granting or
denying preliminary injunctions is not yet fully known, but the
handwriting is clearly on the wall.
Finally, the Supreme Court in Winter suggested that a moving party
may have to make a heightened showing if that party is seeking an

168. See, e.g., cases cited infra note 171.
169. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Los Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009).
Accord South Fork Band Council v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 588 F.3d 718, 721 (9th Cir. 2009);
Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 587 F.3d 966, 973-74 (9th Cir. 2009).
170. Stormans, Inc. v. Selecky, 571 F.3d 960, 977 (9th Cir. 2009), vacated, 586 F.3d
1109 (9th Cir. 2009)
171. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Coop., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582
F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009) (applying the four Winter factors); Real Truth About Obama v.
FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009) (stating Winter overrules prior Circuit precedents);
Titan Tire Corp. v. Case New Holland, Inc., 566 F.3d 1372, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (applying
Winter’s four-factor analysis, observing it is the “longstanding and universal” test); Attorney
Gen. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769, 776 (10th Cir. 2009) (applying the four Winter
factors); RoDa Drilling Co. v. Siegal, 552 F.3d 1203, 1208 (10th Cir. 2009) (same). Cf. Davis
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288, 1292 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (following the fourfactor test in Winter, but stating the Court did not expressly reject prior circuit precedents
applying a “sliding scale” standard).
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affirmative (or mandatory) preliminary injunction as compared to a
prohibitory injunction. 172 Federal courts of appeals have read the
decision in that fashion. 173 In 2000, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
had ruled that the test is “more vigorous” for an affirmative injunction,
requiring the moving party to demonstrate “a clear and substantial”
likelihood of succeeding on the merits. 174 Although the First Circuit has
not yet, in the wake of Winter, addressed the question whether
heightened standards apply to affirmative preliminary injunctions, it has
ruled that temporary mandatory relief may be necessary to protect the
status quo and prevent irreparable injury until a trial on the merits.175
The affirmative injunction is usually in the form of “thou shalt,”
while the prohibitory injunction takes the form of “thou shalt not.” The
line is not always clear between the two forms of injunctions. Through
the use of the “double negative” order, a court will sometimes enter an
injunction that looks like a prohibitory injunction but in fact is an
affirmative (or mandatory) injunction: “The defendant is hereby
enjoined from failing or refusing to remove the tool shed that trespasses
upon plaintiff's property,” or “the defendant is hereby enjoined from
failing or refusing to sell its product to the plaintiff on the same terms
and conditions as it sells that product to plaintiff’s competitors.”
C. First Circuit Court of Appeals 176
1.

Overview

Historically, the United States courts of appeals have differed
widely in their approaches to preliminary relief. 177 The First Circuit is
not an exception. While there is some cross-pollination between and
among the courts of appeals, they essentially have developed their own

172. Winter, 555 U.S. at 24.
173. See Tyson Foods, Inc., 565 F.3d 769; RoDa Drilling Co., 552 F.3d 1203; see also
Tunick v. Safir, 209 F.3d 67 (2d Cir. 2000).
174. Tunick, 209 F.3d at 85.
175. Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano Moving, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir.
1982), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984).
176. Congress created this court in 1891 when it established nine circuit courts of
appeals. 26 Stat. 826 (1891) (commonly referred to as the Evarts Act or the Circuit Court of
Appeals Act of 1891). In 1948, Congress changed the official name of the court from the
“Circuit Court of Appeals” to the “Court of Appeals.” 28 U.S.C. § 43(a) (2006). It is not
technically correct to refer to a Court of Appeals as the “Circuit Court” (formerly a federal
court with original and appellate jurisdiction, which Congress abolished in 1911) or as the
“Circuit Court of Appeals,” which Congress abolished in 1948 when it changed the name of
the court.
177. See generally Wolf, supra note 13.
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criteria. Their decisions have largely been characterized by inconsistent
articulation and application of standards.
Before the Supreme Court’s November 2008 decision in Winter v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, 178 the federal appellate courts had
used at least nine different tests, excluding variations, for interlocutory
relief. 179 Other than an en banc decision in the Eighth Circuit, 180 no
federal appellate court has convened specifically to reconcile these
differences.
Furthermore, while the federal courts have developed various
criteria based on their inherent judicial powers, they have also
recognized special criteria for certain statutory and constitutional claims,
creating additional confusion in the search for uniform standards. 181 In
addition, while the federal appellate courts have not been especially
attentive to Supreme Court precedents involving interlocutory
injunctions, the First Circuit has, on occasion, cited to and even relied on
Supreme Court decisions. 182
2.

Traditional Standards

In one of its early cases over seventy years ago, 183 the First Circuit,
contrary to other courts of appeals, followed the decision of the Supreme
Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway. 184 In Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light
& Power Co., the court, relying on Conway, held that the plaintiff could
secure preliminary relief if it raised serious questions going to the merits,
and if the balance of hardships tipped toward the moving party. 185 In

178. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
179. See generally Wolf, supra note 13.
180. See Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 112 (8th Cir. 1981) (en
banc).
181. See, e.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61 (1974) (federal employment matters);
V.N.A. of Greater Tift County, Inc. v. Heckler, 711 F.2d 1020 (11th Cir. 1983) (Medicare
reimbursement payments), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 936 (1984); Corbin v. Texaco, Inc., 690
F.2d 104 (6th Cir. 1982) (petroleum marketing practices); Deerfield Med. Ctr. v. City of
Deerfield Beach, 661 F.2d 328 (5th Cir. 1981) (First Amendment claim); Middleton-Keirn v.
Stone, 655 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1981) (employment discrimination); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.
Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255 (10th Cir. 1981) (per curiam) (state taxation of railroads).
182. See, e.g., National Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819, 823-25 (1st
Cir. 1979) (citing Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)); Celebrity, Inc. v. Trina,
Inc., 264 F.2d 956 (1st Cir. 1959) (citing Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929) (per
curiam)).
183. Munoz v. Porto Rico Ry. Light & Power Co., 83 F.2d 262, 268 (1st Cir. 1936).
184. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (per curiam); see also Celebrity, 264 F.2d at 958 (relying
on Conway for the proposition that the moving party must show irreparable injury to secure a
preliminary injunction); Hannan v. City of Haverhill, 120 F.2d 87, 90 (1st Cir. 1941) (same).
185. Munoz, 83 F.2d at 269.
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addition the court stated that posting a bond would be a useful device to
prevent injury if the harm to the nonmoving party were more than
“inconsiderable.” 186 By the late l960s, however, the court had moved to
a two-factor analysis for interim relief: likelihood of success on the
merits and immediate irreparable injury, 187 ignoring its earlier view
expressed in Munoz. 188
In the 1970’s, the First Circuit expanded its test for preliminary
relief by adding two other elements: (1) a balancing of the hardships to
the parties; 189 and (2) a public interest factor. 190 Thus by the end of l978,
the First Circuit Court of Appeals had adopted a full-blown four-factor
test for interlocutory injunctions. 191 But the apparent adoption of the
four-factor approach in 1978 did not result in consistent application of it.
In 1979, the First Circuit applied a three-factor analysis, relying on
a Supreme Court case decided in 1975. 192 Two years later the court
186. Id.
187. See, e.g., Automatic Radio Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 390 F.2d 113, 116
(1st Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 914 (1968); accord Interco, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of
Boston, 560 F.2d 480, 482 (1st Cir. 1977); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 360-61 (1st Cir.
1969). In the Automatic Radio case, the court also suggested a sliding scale approach: a
"strong" showing of probability of success might lessen the burden on the movant to
demonstrate irreparable injury. Automatic Radio, 390 F.2d. at 116. In a footnote, the court
also referred offhandedly to the public interest. Id. at 116 n.4.
188. 83 F.2d 262 (1st Cir. 1936).
189. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541-42 (1st Cir. 1976);
Int’l Ass’n of Machinist & Aerospace Workers v. Northeast Airlines, Inc., 473 F.2d 549, 55354 (1st Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 845 (1972). In the SEC case, the court also
suggested a sliding scale approach indicated in Automatic Radio without citing to it. 554 F.2d
at 546. With regard to the balancing factor, the court has usually required only that the
weighing of hardships favors the moving party. In at least one instance, however, it has
declined to allow a preliminary injunction because the movant failed to show that the balance
"tips sufficiently" in her direction. Burgess v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596, 601 (1st Cir. 1982).
Although the First Circuit had used a balancing test in earlier decisions, it made no reference
to them in these cases.
190. Grimard v. Carlston, 567 F.2d 1171, 1173 (1st Cir. 1978). Although the First
Circuit in recent years has generally adhered to the four criteria approach for interlocutory
relief, it has on occasion omitted any reference to the public interest factor. E.g., Doe v.
Brookline Sch. Comm., 722 F.2d 910 (1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701
F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983); Mass. Ass’n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1983); see
also Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, Inc. v. Burke, 608 F.2d 819 (1st Cir. 1979).
191. Levesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 1978).
192. Nat’l Tank Truck Carriers, Inc., 608 F.2d at 823-25 (citing Doran v. Salem Inn,
Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975)); see also Engine Specialties, Inc. v. Bombardier, Ltd., 454 F.2d
527, 530-31 (1st Cir. 1972). Without clearly articulating any standards, the court apparently
applied three factors for interim relief: likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm,
and balance of hardships. Bombardier, 454 F.2d at 530-31. While relying on Doran in
Burke, the court of appeals ignored Doran the previous year when it announced the fourfactor test discussed above, and in 1981, the court read Doran as imposing a two-factor
analysis. Maceira v. Pagan, 649 F.2d 8, 15 (1st Cir. 1981). In 1983, however, it interpreted

WOLF FINAL 51313

2013]

7/13/2013 12:58 PM

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS

29

restated and applied the four-factor approach in the leading case of
Planned Parenthood League of Massachusetts v. Bellotti. 193 Within
three months of Bellotti, however, the First Circuit reverted momentarily
to its earlier two-factor analysis (irreparable injury and probable success
on the merits). 194 But within two weeks, it returned to the four-factor
analysis of Bellotti. 195
Although the Court of Appeals in Bellotti did not discuss any of its
prior suggestions regarding the “sliding scale” modification of the fourfactor test, it did address that question three months later in
Massachusetts Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Defense
Agency. 196 After reaffirming the four elements of its newly restated
standards for interim relief, 197 the court addressed the assertion that a
sliding scale should be applied to that analysis.198 Relying on the
decision of the Fourth Circuit in the Blackwelder case, 199 the First
Doran again to require a three criteria approach. Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7,
9-10 (1st Cir. 1983).
193. 641 F.2d 1006 (1st Cir. 1981). In fact, the court quoted from a 1979 district court
decision that purported to recite the four elements recognized in the First Circuit. Id. at 1009
(quoting Women’s Cmty. Health Ctr. Inc. v. Cohen, 477 F. Supp. 542, 544 (D. Me. 1979)).
The court did not seek to synthesize or rely on its own prior decisions, nor those of the
Supreme Court. In addition, the court made no reference to its prior suggestions regarding the
sliding scale approach.
194. Maceira, 649 F.2d at 8. Interestingly, in this case, the court cited the Doran
opinion as supporting the two-factor approach, even though it had cited Doran two years
earlier for the three-factor test in Nat’l Tank Truck, 649 F.2d at 15; see also Doe, 722 F.2d 910
(applying a two-factor analysis, although it may be linked to the statutory remedy involved in
that case).
195. Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def. Agency, 649 F.2d 71,
74-76 (1st Cir. 1981). While generally requiring the moving party to satisfy each of the four
elements, id., the court has deviated, as the text indicates, from a strict application of that rule.
In one case, it even waived proof on two of the four factors when the court ruled on the legal
contentions of the parties, notwithstanding many prior statements to the contrary that the
merits are not to be addressed on a motion for preliminary relief. Wald v. Regan, 708 F.2d
794, 801 (1st Cir. 1983), rev’d on other grounds, 468 U.S. 222 (1984). In reversing the
judgment of the First Circuit, the Supreme Court did not mention the unorthodox reaching of
the merits on motion for an interlocutory injunction, perhaps because the Court itself has done
that on occasion, see Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008); Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), despite its warnings to the contrary in, for example, Mayo v.
Lakeland Highlands Canning Co., 309 U.S. 310, 316 (1940). See also University of Texas v.
Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390 (1981). As noted earlier, nineteenth Century English and American
practice authorized the issuance of a temporary injunction if the moving party showed a “clear
title or right.” Wald and Sawyer are reminiscent of that earlier doctrine, as is American
Eutectic Welding Alloys Sales Co., Inc. v. Rodriguez, 480 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 1973).
196. 649 F.2d at 74 (1st Cir. 1981). Although the court restated the four-factor analysis
of Bellotti, it failed to cite that case, relying on earlier, less explicit precedents.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 75.
199. Blackwelder Furniture Co. of Statesville, Inc. v. Seilig Mfg. Co., 550 F.2d 189
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Circuit held that the irreparable injury and probable success factors bear
an inverse relationship. 200 A greater showing on one reduces the
showing necessary on the other. In Massachusetts Coalition, the court
found that the plaintiff had shown only a “possible” injury, necessitating
an examination of “likelihood of success” to determine if the showing
was strong enough to compensate for the weaker showing on irreparable
injury. 201
Despite its earlier suggestions regarding the sliding scale
approach 202 and despite its holding in Massachusetts Coalition, the First
Circuit has rarely mentioned the concept since 1978. 203 Indeed in
numerous cases, the court, in reviewing applications for interim relief,
has made no reference at all to the sliding scale variation.204
Furthermore, in other cases, it has implicitly rejected the sliding scale
analysis by affirming a denial of interim relief because the movant had
failed to show either irreparable injury, 205 probable success on the
merits, 206 or both. 207
(4th Cir. 1977). In light of the Supreme Court’s decision in Winter the Fourth Circuit has
abandoned its “sliding scale” approach. Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342 (4th
Cir. 2009). But cf. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d 1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009)
(following the four-factor test in Winter, but stating the Court did not expressly reject prior
Circuit precedents applying a “sliding scale” standard).
200. Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities, 649 F.2d at 75.
201. Id.
202. See supra notes 191-198 and accompanying text.
203. See Mass. Ass’n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749 (1st Cir. 1983) (mentioning
sliding scale, but not applying it); Auburn News Co., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d
273 (1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982) (passing reference to sliding scale).
204. E.g., New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir.
2002); Martinez v. R.I. Hous. & Mortgage Fin. Corp., 738 F.2d 21 (1st Cir. 1984); Kenworth
of Boston, Inc. v. Paccar Fin. Corp., 735 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1984); Massachusetts v. Watt, 716
F.2d 946 (1st Cir. 1983); LeBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639 (1st Cir. 1983); S.F. Real Estate
Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000 (1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of
Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983); Crowley v. Local No. 82 Furniture and Piano
Moving, 679 F.2d 978 (1st Cir. 1982), rev’d on other grounds, 467 U.S. 526 (1984); Burgess
v. Affleck, 683 F.2d 596 (1st Cir. 1982); Mass. Ass’n for Retarded Citizens, Inc. v. King, 668
F.2d 602 (1st Cir. 1981); Town of Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981);
see also Lynch v. Dukakis, 719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983) (containing no discussion of either
the four criteria or the sliding scale variation).
205. E.g., Rushia, 701 F.2d at 10 (affirming denial of interlocutory injunction because
movant failed to show irreparable injury); Town of Burlington v. Dep't of Educ., 655 F.2d
428, 432 (1st Cir. 1981) (same); Levesque v. Maine, 587 F.2d 78 (1st Cir. 1978) (same);
Interco, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank of Boston, 560 F.2d 480, 486 (1st Cir. 1977) (same).
206. E.g., Spath v. NCAA, 728 F.2d 25, 27 (1st Cir. 1984) (affirming denial of
interlocutory injunction because movant failed to show likelihood of ultimate success on the
merits); McDonough v. Trustees of University Sys. of N.H., 704 F.2d 780, 784 (1st Cir. 1983)
(same); LeBeau, 703 F.2d at 642-43 (same); Burgess, 683 F.2d at 602 (same); Mass. Ass’n for
Retarded Citizens, Inc., 668 F.2d at 607-08 (same); S.S. Kresge Co. v. United Factory Outlet,
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While the court of appeals has not delivered a deathblow to the
sliding scale concept 208 it brought forth in Massachusetts Coalition, it
has apparently rendered it moribund. In many decisions, the court has
noted that the likelihood of success factor is “the sine qua non,” 209 “the
main bearing wall,” 210 the “crucial” 211 element, and “the critical
question” 212 among the four criteria. 213 The court of appeals has noted
that, even if the irreparable injury is “excruciatingly obvious,” the
movant must still show probability of success on the merits. 214 If the
moving party fails to establish that essential element, “the remaining
factors become matters of idle curiosity.” 215
Emphasizing the “likelihood” factor means that no matter how
strong the showing on irreparable injury, the movant must still prove
likelihood of success on the merits. In its 2008 decision in Winter, the
Supreme Court agreed with the First Circuit on this point.216 The recent
cases in the First Circuit have routinely recited and applied the fourfactor test for preliminary relief, 217 having now utilized it for almost 30
Inc., 598 F.2d 694, 695, 698 (1st Cir. 1979) (same); see also Tuxworth v. Froehlke, 449 F.2d
763, 764 (1st Cir. 1971). Indeed the court has stated that failure to demonstrate any one factor
precludes the issuance of preliminary relief no matter what the showing on the other criteria.
See Mass. Coalition of Citizens with Disabilities v. Civil Def. Agency, 649 F.2d 71, 74 (1st
Cir. 1981).
207. E.g., Kenworth of Boston, Inc. v. Paccar Fin. Corp., 735 F.2d 622 (1st Cir. 1984).
208. “If a great showing of likely success on the merits is made by a plaintiff, a reduced
showing of irreparable harm may be appropriate.” Turner v. City of Boston, 760 F. Supp. 2d
216, 218 (D.Mass. 2011) (quoting Cablevision of Boston, Inc. v. Pub. Imp. Com’n, 38 F.
Supp. 2d 46, 53 (D.Mass. 1999)), (citing to Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, 102
F.3d 12, 19 (1st Cir. 1996) and EEOC v. Astra USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 738, 743 (1st Cir. 1996)).
209. New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002).
210. Ross-Simons, 102 F.3d at 16.
211. S.F. Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000, 1003
(1st Cir. 1983).
212. LeBeau v. Spirito, 703 F.2d 639, 643 (1st Cir. 1983).
213. See also Waldron v. George Weston Bakeries, Inc., 570 F.3d 5, 9 (1st Cir. 2009);
Auburn News Co., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st Cir. 1981) (“[T]he
probability-of-success component has loomed large in cases before this court”), cert. denied,
455 U.S. 921 (1982); accord, Mass. Ass’n of Older Ams. v. Sharp, 700 F.2d 749, 751 (1st Cir.
1983).
214. LeBeau, 703 F.2d at 642 (quoting Coalition for Basic Human Needs v. King, 654
F.2d 838, 841 (1st Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). But see Cintron-Garcia v. Romero-Barcelo, 671
F.2d 1, 4 n.2 (1st Cir. 1982) (per curiam) (intimating in dictum that the probability factor may
not be as important if the harm to the moving party is “particularly severe and
disproportionate,” an approach that may partially resurrect the sliding scale formulation).
215. New Comm Wireless Servs., Inc. v. SprintCom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 2002).
216. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
217. See, e.g., ANSYS, Inc. v. Computational Dynamics N. Am., Ltd., 595 F.3d 75, 78
(1st Cir. 2010); Nieves-Marquez v. Puerto Rico, 353 F.3d 108, 120 (1st Cir. 2003); S.E.C. v.
Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002); New Comm., 287 F.3d at 8-9; EF Cultural Travel BV v.
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years, without any reference to a sliding scale approach. This stability of
approach in the First Circuit since 1981 mirrors the stability of criteria
for preliminary relief in the Massachusetts state courts under the regime
of Packaging Industries. 218
Finally, despite the stability of the four-factor analysis over the past
30 years, the court of appeals has injected uncertainties into the
disposition of motions for temporary injunctions. For example, it has
treated the concept of inadequate remedy at law, which the Supreme
Court has called the essence of injunctive relief in the federal courts, 219
in at least three different ways. First, it has equated inadequacy with
irreparable injury. 220 That is, the moving party must show that her
remedy at law is inadequate in order to demonstrate irreparable injury.
Ordinarily, the legal remedy is adequate if the injury can be
compensated through money damages. In this sense, adequate remedy at
law and irreparable injury are mutually exclusive concepts: the presence
of one means the absence of the other.
Second, the court, on occasion, has treated the adequacy notion as
an independent factor in the formula for interim relief. 221 In other
words, the moving party must establish inadequacy of the legal remedy
in addition to the four other criteria. Third, in some cases, the court has
simply ignored the question whether the moving party has shown that
her legal remedy is not adequate. 222 In contrast, the SJC has defined
irreparable injury quite clearly: “In the context of a preliminary
injunction the only rights which may be irreparably lost are those not
capable of vindication by a final judgment, rendered either at law or in

Explorica, Inc., 274 F.3d 577, 581 (1st Cir. 2001); Suarez-Cestero v. Pagan-Rosa, 172 F.3d
102, 104 (1st Cir. 1999); Ross-Simons of Warwick, Inc. v. Baccarat, Inc., 102 F.3d 12, 15 (1st
Cir. 1996); see Chevron P.R., LLC v. Rivera Guzman, 2010 WL 446585, at *2 (D.P.R.). On
occasion, the First Circuit has added the adverb “substantially” to the likely to succeed factor.
See Lanier Professional Servs., Inc. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999).
218. See generally Kerry, supra note 8.
219. E.g., Sampson v. Murray, 415 U.S. 61, 88 (1974). The Court has made the same
statement regarding motions for permanent injunctions. E.g., Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975).
220. E.g., Itek Corp. v. First Nat’l Bank of Bos., 730 F.2d 19, 22-23 (1st Cir. 1984);
Levesque v. State of Maine, 587 F.2d 78, 80 (1st Cir. 1978); Interco, Inc. v. First Nat’l Bank
of Bos., 560 F.2d 480, 484-86 (1st Cir. 1977); Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 363 (1st Cir.
1969).
221. E.g., Auburn News Co., Inc. v. Providence Journal Co., 659 F.2d 273, 277 (1st
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 921 (1982).
222. E.g., S.F. Real Estate Investors v. Real Estate Inv. Trust of Am., 701 F.2d 1000
(1st Cir. 1983); Rushia v. Town of Ashburnham, 701 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1983); Town of
Burlington v. Dep’t of Educ., 655 F.2d 428 (1st Cir. 1981).
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equity.” 223
3.

Abbreviated Standards

Like the Massachusetts state courts, the federal courts have also
developed an abbreviated set of standards for preliminary relief. The
state courts have reduced to two factors the showing needed in civil
actions commenced by the Attorney General and other governmental
units and private attorneys general.224 The federal courts have applied
abbreviated standards in so-called statutory injunction cases, reducing
the showing to one factor. That is, where a federal statute authorizes
injunctive relief, some courts have held that the moving party need only
show “reasonable cause” 225 to believe the defendant has violated or is
about to violate the statute. In such cases, Congress is deemed to have
determined that the other three traditional criteria (i.e., irreparable injury,
balancing of the harms, and the public interest) favor the moving party.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals, however, has not generally
followed the path of other federal appellate courts in applying such
truncated standards. Principally, the First Circuit has read Supreme
Court precedents to preclude the casual application of abbreviated
standards to the request for an interlocutory injunction. Before
exploring the analysis of the First Circuit, this Article addresses the
approach of the other courts of appeals.
The federal appellate courts adopting these abbreviated standards
generally trace this line of cases, if they trace it at all, to the decisions of
the Supreme Court in United States v. San Francisco 226 and Tennessee
Valley Authority v. Hill, 227 both of which involved permanent, not
temporary, injunctive relief. In contrast, the Court’s decision in Porter
v. Warner Holding Co. 228 seems to look in a different direction,
requiring clear congressional intent to alter traditional criteria for
223. Packaging Indus. Grp. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 112 n.11 (Mass. 1980). See
also FISS AND RENDLEMEN, supra note 40. In the context of a request for a permanent
injunction, “irreparable harm” means that the moving party does not have an adequate remedy
at law (i.e., ordinarily damages).
224. See supra notes 57-76 and accompanying text.
225. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Bair, 957 F.2d 599, 604 (8th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
506 U.S. 821 (1992) (4-R Act forbidding discriminatory state taxation of railroads); see also
Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Lennen, 640 F.2d 255, 261 (l0th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)
(same).
226. 310 U.S. 16 (1940) (Raker Act granting certain rights in federal lands to local
government).
227. 437 U.S. 153 (1978) (Endangered Species Act protecting the habitats of moribund
animals).
228. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
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injunctive relief before courts can apply abbreviated standards:
Moreover, the comprehensiveness of this equitable jurisdiction is not
to be denied or limited in the absence of a clear and valid legislative
command. Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary and
inescapable inference, restricts the court’s jurisdiction in equity, the
229
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied.

Although some courts, like the Eighth and Tenth Circuit Courts of
Appeals, 230 have regularly utilized and applied this line of cases, other
federal courts, including the federal courts in Massachusetts, have been
less active. For example, in SEC v. J & B Industries, Inc., 231 a
Massachusetts federal district court did not require the SEC to show
irreparable harm because the SEC sought preliminary relief under the
securities statutes. The SEC was entitled to a preliminary injunction, the
court ruled, so long as it made a prima facie showing of violation and
protecting the public interest outweighed the harm to the defendants. 232
In a recent case arising under the Safe Drinking Water Act, 233 the First
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the abbreviated standards line of
decisions (sometimes referred to as a “statutory” injunction as compared
to the judge-made law), including Bair and Lennen. It declined,
however, to apply that line of decisions without taking account of the
restrictions in Porter. 234
Thus in order for the United States to obtain a permanent injunction
in the First Circuit against the Massachusetts Water Resources Authority
for violating the Safe Drinking Water Act, it must satisfy the traditional
four criteria for injunctive relief.235 The First Circuit took the same
approach by applying the four-factor test for a preliminary injunction
sought by a government agency, which argued for the application of
abbreviated standards. 236
On the other hand, if the party moving for a preliminary injunction
can show that Congress clearly intended to depart from traditional
229. Id. at 398; accord, Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 311-13 (1982).
Compare Tennessee Vally Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978) with Weinberger, 456 U.S.
at 311-13.
230. See supra note 225.
231. SEC v. J & B Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082 (D. Mass. 1974). The First Circuit
may have overruled this decision sub silentio in SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1 (1st Cir. 2002).
232. The Massachusetts SJC has taken a similar approach when government entities
seek preliminary injunctions. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
233. United States v. Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d 36 (1st Cir. 2001).
234. Id. at 47-48.
235. Id. at 50-51.
236. SEC v. Fife, 311 F.3d 1, 8 (1st Cir. 2002).
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equitable principles, or if that conclusion is “necessary and
inescapable” 237 based on the text, legislative history, structure, and
purpose of the statute, the First Circuit Court of Appeals will apply the
abbreviated standards. 238 In its two leading cases, 239 the First Circuit
held that the government had failed to make the proper showing, so it
affirmed the orders denying an injunction based on the traditional four
factors. 240
IV. THE ERIE/HANNA DOCTRINE
A. Overview
Derived from the landmark ruling in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 241
the Erie doctrine arises when a federal court is asked to apply state law
in pending litigation. 242 Such requests for the application of state law
arise in myriad circumstances. Erie itself settled the question as to state
“substantive” law. It premised its holding on the Rules of Decision
Act, 243 which calls for the application of state law unless federal law
otherwise requires or provides.
In 1938, the same year the Supreme Court decided Erie, it also
adopted the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for civil actions
commenced in a federal court, including where a plaintiff asserted a
claim based on state law. Prior to their adoption, the federal trial courts
had applied generally state rules of procedure in actions at law. 244
Actions in equity and admiralty were excepted from the general rule.245
Thus after 1938, using legal shorthand, the federal courts would apply
state “substantive” law in the absence of superseding federal law and
federal “procedural” rules even if state law created the plaintiff’s claim.
Soon after Erie the Supreme Court realized that the line between
237. Porter v. Warner Holding Co., 328 U.S. 395, 398 (1946).
238. Fife, 311 F.3d at 8; Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d at 48.
239. Fife, 311 F.3d at 8; Mass. Water Res. Auth., 256 F.3d at 48.
240. The four-factor test for a permanent injunction is nearly identical to the four-factor
test for a preliminary injunction. The only difference is that for a permanent injunction, the
moving party must show actual success on the merits rather than simply a likelihood of
success. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 32 (2008); cf. Mass. Water Res.
Auth., 256 F.3d at 50 n.15.
241. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
242. The so-called “reverse-Erie” doctrine arises when a state court is asked to apply a
federal procedural rule to a federal claim. See supra note 6.
243. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006), which derived from Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1789. 1 Stat. 92 (1789).
244. See generally FALLON, JR. ET AL., supra note 87, at 533-43.
245. Id.; see supra note 122.
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“substance” and “procedure” was not so easily drawn. 246
The discussion here is limited to the basic Erie question: whether a
federal judge should apply state law of interlocutory injunctions to a
state claim in a civil action pending in the federal court. When
confronted with a motion for preliminary relief in these Erie-type civil
actions, the federal district court must decide whether to apply state or
federal standards, traditional or abbreviated, to the request for the
injunctive remedy when the claim is rooted in state law.
Perhaps not surprisingly, the courts have not devoted extensive
analysis to the issue. For example, in Grupo Mexico de Desarrollo, S.A.
v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 247 one of a handful of cases where the
question has surfaced, the Supreme Court refused to entertain the
argument that state law should govern motions for preliminary
injunctions in federal civil actions asserting state claims. The Court
noted that the party seeking to raise the Erie issue in the Supreme Court
waived the point because it did not present the question to the lower
federal courts. 248
B. The First Circuit and Other Authority
The First Circuit Court of Appeals has taken the same approach as
the Supreme Court in Grupo Mexico, insisting upon the longstanding
rule that the party raising an issue, including the Erie doctrine, generally
must first bring it to the attention of the trial judge. 249 In other decisions,
the First Circuit has simply applied federal preliminary injunction
standards to state-based claims without discussing the Erie doctrine,
while applying state law to the substantive issues. 250 Thus while the
“likely to succeed on the merits” criterion as a standard for temporary
relief is rooted in federal law, the determination whether a plaintiff
asserting a state law claim is in fact “likely to succeed” is a state law
question under Erie. 251
246. See, e.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
247. 527 U.S. 308, 318 n. 3 (1999).
248. Id.
249. Charlesbank Equity Fund II v. Blinds To Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir.
2004) (party waived the Erie objection by not raising it in the district court). In sharp
contrast, subject matter jurisdiction is an exception to the general rule, as the federal courts
have a “duty” to raise it sua sponte even if no party challenges the court’s jurisdiction.
Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908).
250. Waterproofing Sys., Inc. v. Hydro-Stop, Inc., 440 F.3d 24, 33 (1st Cir. 2006);
Lanier Prof’l Servs., Inc. v. Ricci, 192 F.3d 1, 3 (1st Cir. 1999); Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc.
v. PepsiCo, Inc., 160 F.3d 58, 60-61 (1st Cir. 1998).
251. Hydro-Stop, Inc., 440 F.3d at 33; Lake Charles Diesel, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
328 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2003).
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In Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc. v. PepsiCo, Inc., 252 however, the
First Circuit acknowledged that the Erie doctrine could apply to motions
for preliminary injunctions. Without delving into the intricacies of the
question, the court disposed of the matter on the practical ground that the
“Massachusetts standards [referring to the three-step approach of
Packaging Industries] for a preliminary injunction do not seem
markedly different” 253 from the federal standards. The court added that
the parties in the case had not pointed to any “pertinent state-law
difference that would govern a federal court in a diversity matter.” 254
The following year, the First Circuit took the same approach: it applied
federal standards to a motion for temporary relief based on state claims
“where the parties have not suggested that state law supplies
meaningfully different criteria.” 255
Upon closer inspection, however, the Massachusetts state standards
are “markedly” or “meaningfully” different from the federal standards.
In cases between private parties, for example, the state courts have
applied a sliding scale, three-step approach under Packaging
Industries, 256 while the federal courts in the First Circuit have applied
the four-factor test of Bellotti, 257 which the United States Supreme Court
recently confirmed in Winter. 258
For example, the federal standards include an inquiry into the
impact of the preliminary injunction on the “public interest,” while the
state standards under Packaging Industries do not include that criterion
in strictly private party litigation. In the Winter decision, the Supreme
Court ruled that the impact of a preliminary injunction on the public
interest is a critical matter, which the lower federal courts must carefully
examine. 259 Indeed in Winter, the Supreme Court’s inquiry into the
public interest made a huge difference in the outcome of the motion for
interlocutory relief. In private litigation under Packaging Industries, the
public interest is not a factor.
In addition, the Packaging Industries standards employ a “sliding

252. 160 F.3d 58 (1st Cir. 1998).
253. Id. at 61; accord, Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882 F.2d 797
(3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hanna).
254. Ocean Spray Cranberries, Inc., 160 F.3d at 61.
255. Lanier, 192 F.3d at 3; accord, Bio-Imaging Techs., Inc. v. Marchant, 584 F. Supp.
2d 322 (D. Mass. 2008).
256. Packaging Indus. Grp., Inc. v. Cheney, 405 N.E.2d 106, 111-12 (Mass. 1980).
257. Planned Parenthood League of Mass. v. Bellotti, 641 F.2d 1006, 1009 (1st Cir.
1981).
258. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
259. Id.
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scale” with respect to each party’s assertions of irreparable harm and
likelihood of succeeding on the merits, coupled with a balancing test.
Federal courts, which previously applied a sliding scale test, have
abandoned it after Winter for the four-factor test the First Circuit has
followed for 30 years. 260 Thus these two approaches, Packaging
Industries and Winter, are substantially different in their formulations
and results.
Furthermore, under state court precedents, the Attorney General,
other governmental units, or “private” attorneys general need only
satisfy a two-part test to secure temporary injunctive relief. 261 In such
cases, the plaintiff must demonstrate only that it is likely to succeed on
the merits and that the public interest is advanced or not adversely
affected. 262 The federal courts in the First Circuit apply the same fourfactor test of Bellotti (and now Winter) no matter who the plaintiff is.
Other federal courts, applying federal standards to motions for
preliminary injunctions, have reached the same conclusion as the First
Circuit in Erie-type cases, sometimes traveling a different route. For
example, the Sixth Circuit has referred to the temporary injunction
standards as “procedural jurisprudence,” 263 while applying state law to
the substantive question whether the moving party is likely to prevail on
the merits. Without extensive analysis, the Fourth Circuit 264 and the
Tenth Circuit 265 Courts of Appeals have expressly rejected the
application of state preliminary injunction standards to state claims
pending in federal court.
The Fourth Circuit agreed that state law would apply to the motion
for a permanent injunction, but not to a motion for a temporary
injunction, which only seeks to preserve the status quo 266 and thus
arguably procedural, not substantive. The court also observed that the
state (Virginia) and federal standards for preliminary relief in that case

260. E.g., Real Truth About Obama v. FEC, 575 F.3d 342, 346-47 (4th Cir. 2009),
vacated, 130 S. Ct. 2371 (2010) (mem.) (noting Winter overrules prior Circuit precedents,
including “sliding scale” approach). But cf. Davis v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 571 F.3d
1288 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (following the four-factor test in Winter, but stating the Court did not
expressly reject prior Circuit precedents applying a “sliding scale” standard).
261. See Packaging Indus., 405 N.E.2d at 114.
262. See supra Part II.
263. Certified Restoration Dry Cleaning Network, L.L.C. v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535,
541 (6th Cir. 2007).
264. Capital Tool & Mfg. Co. v. Maschinenfabrik Herkules, 837 F.2d 171, 172 (4th Cir.
1988).
265. Equifax Servs., Inc. v. Hitz, 905 F.2d 1355, 1361 (10th Cir. 1990).
266. Capital Tool, 837 F.2d at 172.
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have “no great difference.” 267 The Tenth Circuit decision has less
analysis than the Fourth Circuit opinion. It simply states that the Erie
doctrine “does not apply to preliminary injunction standards.” 268 Several
of these cases relied on the Wright, Miller, and Kane treatise on Federal
Practice and Procedure, which states categorically that federal standards
always apply to motions for preliminary injunctions in federal courts. 269
In contrast, Professor Burbank has argued that the Wright, Miller,
and Kane treatise is not correct in applying federal standards to movants
seeking preliminary injunctions based on state claims, referring to the
treatise’s argument as “an example of [federal court] overreaching.” 270
Consequently, federal courts, when deciding motions for interlocutory
relief, “would be required to yield to the requirements of contrary state
law.” 271 In this sense, Rule 65, which contains procedures for
preliminary injunctions and temporary restraining orders, is procedural
and does not incorporate the equitable standards for temporary
injunctive relief. At least one federal district court allowed that if state
law precludes an injunctive remedy, the federal court could not award it.
“It would be anomalous to grant preliminary relief on a state law claim
that would be unavailable were this case brought in a state court.” 272
Before discussing the general outlines of the Erie doctrine as it
applies to preliminary injunctions, it is important to note another line of
cases in the First Circuit that bears on our analysis. Thirty-six years ago
in Marshall v. Mulrenin, 273 the First Circuit Court of Appeals confronted
the question of whether the more generous relation back law of
Massachusetts should govern an amendment to the complaint that added
new parties after the expiration of the statute of limitations.
Following the decision in Hanna v. Plumer, 274 the trial judge
applied Rule 15(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to deny the

267. Id. at 173.
268. Equifax, 905 F.2d at 1361. It cites only to Volume 11C of the WRIGHT & MILLER,
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 2943, at 390 (1973).
269. WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D §
2943 (1995 with 2011 supplement); see also WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4513 (1996 with 2011 supplement).
270. Burbank, supra note 24, at 1320 n.161.
271. Id. at 1320.
272. John Paul Mitchell Sys. v. Quality King Distributors, Inc., 106 F. Supp. 2d 462,
478 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
273. 508 F.2d 39, 41 (1st Cir. 1974).
274. 380 U.S. 460 (1965) (discussed infra) (in Hanna, a diversity case, the Supreme
Court unanimously reversed the First Circuit Court of Appeals, requiring the application of
Federal Civil Rule 4 rather than a more restrictive state statute on service of process in estate
administration).
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motion to amend. The court of appeals vacated the judgment, and
remanded for further proceedings. It held that the state relation back law
should be applied, rather than Federal Rule 15(c), because “although cast
in procedural terms, [it] has a direct substantive effect.” 275 Recently the
First Circuit, while affirming the essence of Mulrenin, noted that Hanna
rejected the application of the substance/procedure line and the
“outcome determination” test to conflicts involving the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 276
C. Erie and Hanna
1. Background
This section will discuss the Erie doctrine as applied to preliminary
injunctions. We should recall that Erie held, in light of the Rules of
Decision Act 277 and the powers of the federal courts, “there is no federal
general common law.” 278 Unless federal law otherwise requires or
provides, the federal court must apply the “laws of the several states.”279
Thus the decision has come to mean that when state claims are asserted
in a federal court, the law of that state governs the rulings on the
substantive claims.
Courts and practitioners sometimes assume that the Erie doctrine
applies only to civil actions invoking the diversity jurisdiction. 280 That
assumption is not correct, although post-Erie decisions have
occasionally intimated it. 281 Over 50 years ago, the Second Circuit
Court of Appeals stated that
[I]t is the source of the right sued upon, and not the ground on which
federal jurisdiction over the case is founded, which determines the

275. Mulrenin, 508 F.2d at 44; accord, Covel v. Savetech, Inc., 90 F.R.D. 427, 430 (D.
Mass. 1981) (following the Mulrenin holding, rejecting apparently contrary law in other
circuits). In 1991, the Supreme Court amended Rule 15 to reflect the holding in Mulrenin.
See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 15(c)(1)(A).
276. Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009).
277. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) (“The laws of the several states, except where the
Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide,
shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the United States, in
cases where they apply.”).
278. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 70, 78 (1938).
279. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
280. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
281. See Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965); Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99,
109 (1945). But see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966) (Erie applies to
state claims asserted in federal court under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction (now referred
to as supplemental jurisdiction)).
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governing law . . . . Thus, the Erie doctrine applies, whatever the
ground for federal jurisdiction, to any issue or claim which has its
282
source in state law.

State substantive law claims, governed by the Erie doctrine, may
arise in a federal court in at least three types of cases or controversies:
(1) where a state claim is asserted based on diversity jurisdiction; 283 (2)
where a state claim is asserted based on supplemental jurisdiction; 284 and
(3) where a state claim contains an essential federal element within
general federal question jurisdiction. 285 In each instance, the federal
court may have to confront the Erie doctrine. In federal question
litigation, where state claims are frequently joined with federal claims
under supplemental jurisdiction, the matter may become more complex
since the court may need to apply a federal rule to the federal claims and
a state rule to the state claims. 286
In Erie doctrine cases, the court is asked to apply state law even
though the civil action is pending in a federal court. The Rules of
Decision Act, 287 which Congress first enacted in 1789, commanded that
result, unless federal law “otherwise require[s] or provide[s].” 288 The
Supreme Court departed from that statute in Swift v. Tyson, 289
authorizing the federal courts to apply “federal general common law” in
controversies based on diversity jurisdiction if the claim involved a
question of “general” or “commercial” law (as compared to “local” law).
Ninety-six years later in 1938, the Court overruled Swift in the Erie
decision. 290
In 1938, the Supreme Court also approved the newly drafted
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for use in the federal district courts.

282. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d
Cir. 1956) (emphasis in the original).
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 545
U.S. 546 (2005).
284. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); Allapattah, 545 U.S. 546; cf. United Mine Workers
v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
285. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1039 (2013); Grable &
Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005); see also Smith v.
Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921); cf. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v.
Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986).
286. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 302 (presumptions); FED. R. EVID. 501 (privileges); 28
U.S.C. (2006) (the state law of presumptions and privileges applies where it provides the rule
of decision for “an element of a claim or defense”).
287. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
288. Id.
289. Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
290. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 85 (1938).

WOLF FINAL 51313

42

7/13/2013 12:58 PM

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 35:1

Prior to 1938, the federal courts had applied state procedural rules for
actions at law. 291 Thus by the end of 1938, the federal courts in diversity
cases were applying state substantive rules under Erie where they might
have applied federal substantive rules under Swift. At the same time,
they were also applying the new federal civil rules where they would
have applied state procedural rules prior to 1938. “Under the Erie
doctrine, federal courts sitting in diversity apply state substantive law
and federal procedural law.” 292
In the wake of Erie, the difficulty the federal courts now confronted
was where to draw the line between substance and procedure for Erie
purposes, “a challenging endeavor.” 293 The Supreme Court struggled
with that line, realizing early that some rules or law could be
characterized either as substantive or procedural, such as statutes of
limitation. 294 Within seven years after the Erie decision, it settled on an
“outcome determinative” test. 295 That is, the federal court would apply
the state “procedural” rule if it determined the outcome of the litigation,
as would be the case with limitations periods. When that test proved
inadequate, the Court formulated a balancing test of state and federal
interests. 296 In 1965, it sought to settle the matter in Hanna v. Plumer. 297
In the Hanna decision, 298 the Supreme Court held that Erie
problems fall into two broad categories: (1) where the conflicting federal
“procedural” law arguably falls within the scope of a civil rule
promulgated pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act 299 (REA) (hereinafter
291. For actions in equity, the Supreme Court had promulgated special rules for such
proceedings in the federal trial courts. See supra, notes 99-100.
292. Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). This
statement would apply to any claim rooted in state law, regardless of its jurisdictional basis in
federal court. Maternally Yours, Inc. v. Your Maternity Shop, Inc., 234 F.2d 538, 540-41 n.1
(2d Cir. 1956).
293. Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 427 (citation omitted).
294. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945). But cf. McCluny v. Silliman, 28
U.S. 270, 277 (1830) (stating statutes of limitations are “rules of decision” within the meaning
of the Rules of Decision Act, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006) and requiring the
application of state limitation periods to claims in federal courts in the absence of a valid
federal limitation period).
295. Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109.
296. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525, 535 (1958). The
balancing of state and federal interests appears to have survived the decision in Hanna. See
generally Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini, 518
U.S. 415.
297. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
298. E.g., Hanna, 380 U.S. 460 (dispute involving Rule 4 of the Civil Rules); Stewart
Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22 (1988) (dispute involving 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a)).
299. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling
Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (the definitive article on the REA).
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referred to as “rules” conflicts); and (2) where the conflicting federal
“procedural” law is outside the scope of the REA or other federal statute
(hereinafter referred to as “non-rules” conflicts). 300 In Hanna, the Court
did not discuss a third possibility: a conflict between an act of Congress
and state law. 301 Under Hanna, the criteria to determine whether state or
federal law should govern the dispute falls into two categories. One set
of criteria governs “rules” conflicts, while another set governs “nonrules” conflicts. 302
Federal civil actions involving motions for preliminary injunctions
reasonably could fall into either of the two categories of conflicts and on
either side of the line drawn in Hanna. If such a motion is viewed as
governed by Rule 65 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, then it
falls on the “rules” side of the Hanna line (as was the case in Hanna
itself, which involved Rule 4, the service of process rule). If, on the
other hand, the standards governing a motion for a temporary injunction
are seen as part of the judge-made law of equity, it would fall on the
“non-rules” side of Hanna. In all cases, the courts appear to start with
the premise that the conflict between state and federal law is not clearly
substantive or procedural, which would be an easy case. Rather the
assumption is that the matter at issue falls somewhere between substance
and procedure, in short, “rationally capable of classification as either.” 303
2.

Rules Conflicts

If the state/federal conflict falls on the “rules” side of the Hanna
line, the Supreme Court has identified a three-step process to resolve the
potential conflict. 304 First, the federal court determines if the asserted
federal rule covers or addresses the disputed matter, creating a direct or
genuine conflict with state law. If not, then the court should apply both
300. See also WRIGHT AND KANE, supra, note 131, at § 59. See generally
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 131, at § 5.3.5.
301. The Court has since addressed the Erie doctrine when the conflict is between a
federal statute and a state law. Stewart Org., 487 U.S. 22 (dispute involving 28 U.S.C. §
1404(a)). In Ricoh, the Court articulated a two-step process that courts should follow: (1)
decide whether the federal statute and the state law genuinely conflict; and (2) if so, decide
whether the federal statute is constitutional, thus superseding state law under the Supremacy
Clause in Art.VI of the United States Constitution. Id. at 34-35.
302. In the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in the Erie/Hanna line of cases,
Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, indicated that the two categories operate sequentially rather than
independently. Thus if the Court concludes that the state law and the federal rule of civil
procedure do not conflict, it must then apply the twin goals of Erie to the state law. Shady
Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct, 1431, 1450 (2010).
303. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 472.
304. In Shady Grove, Justice Scalia appeared to adopt a two-step approach, although his
opinion did not command a majority of the Court. 130 S. Ct. at 1450.
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state and federal law since the federal rule does not reach the disputed
question. 305
For example, in Palmer v. Hoffman, 306 the parties disagreed
whether the plaintiff or the defendant had the burden to plead and prove
contributory negligence. The plaintiff relied on Rule 8(c) (contributory
negligence is an affirmative defense) to place the burden on the
defendant, while the defendant argued for the application of the state
rule that the plaintiff must prove the absence of contributory
negligence. 307 The Court held that the federal and state rules do not
conflict: the defendant has the burden to plead contributory negligence
under Rule 8(c), while the plaintiff has the burden to prove the absence
of contributory negligence under state law once the defendant has raised
the issue under Rule 8(c). 308
Second, if the federal rule is broad enough to cover or address the
dispute, the conflict between state and federal law is genuine. The court
must then determine, before applying the federal rule to displace state
law, if the federal rule is within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act
(REA): whether it is a rule of “practice or procedure” under § 2072(a)
and whether it abridges, enlarges, or modifies “any substantive right”
under § 2072(b). If the federal rule is “rationally capable of
classification,” 309 as Hanna ruled, either as substantive or procedural, the
court will treat it as one of “practice and procedure” under § 2072(a). 310
Having thus classified it as a “procedural” matter (or at least reasonably
or arguably so), the federal rule consequently would not abridge any
“substantive” right under § 2072(b). 311

305. E.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001) (no genuine
conflict between the state law of claim preclusion and Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure); Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980) (no direct conflict between
state limitations period tolling provision upon service of process and Rule 3 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure, where civil action commences upon filing, not upon service of
process).
306. Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943). Four well-known scholars have referred
to such cases as “strained” interpretations of the rules to avoid addressing their validity under
the REA. RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER & DAVID L.
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 548
(6th ed. 2009).
307. Palmer, 318 U.S. at 116-19.
308. Id. In the Supreme Court’s most recent decision in the Erie/Hanna line, Justice
Scalia appeared less willing to avoid such conflicts, although his opinion did not garner a
majority of the justices. Shady Grove, 130 S. Ct. at 1431. In contrast, Justice Ginsburg,
dissenting, sought to avoid such conflicts. Id. at 1470 (Ginsburg J., dissenting).
309. Hanna v. Plummer, 380 U.S. 460, 472 (1965).
310. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(a) (the Rules Enabling Act).
311. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (the Rules Enabling Act).
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Third and finally, the federal judge must determine if the federal
“procedural” rule is constitutional. Since Congress has the power to
establish federal courts and prescribe rules for their governance under
Article III of the Constitution and the Necessary and Proper Clause of
Article I, as the Court ruled in Hanna, any rule deemed to be procedural
will pass constitutional muster. 312 The Court’s approach in Hanna lead
Justice Harlan, concurring, to criticize the majority’s approach as
“arguably procedural, ergo constitutional.” 313 The concurrence stated
that such an approach passes over the critical limitation in the REA:
“Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive
right.” 314
As explored earlier, a state claim in a Massachusetts federal court
could be subject to conflicting state and federal standards on a motion
If the state claim were in a
for a preliminary injunction.315
Massachusetts state court, the trial judge would apply a two-factor, a
three-step, or a four-stage approach, depending on the criteria noted
earlier in this article. 316 If the state claim were in federal court, the
federal trial judge would ordinarily apply the four-factor test under the
Supreme Court’s decision in Winter and the First Circuit’s decision in
Bellotti and its progeny. 317 Applying the state and federal standards to
the state claim could very well lead to different results, with the moving
party, say, prevailing under the state standards, while the non-moving
party would prevail under the federal standards.
At this point in the proceedings, the federal judge would ask if the
conflict is in the “rules” category or the “non-rules” category under
Hanna v. Plumer. Assuming that Rule 65 is the source of the federal
standards for preliminary injunctions, then any conflict with state
standards for temporary relief would fall into the “rules” category under
Hanna.
If so, then the path to their application is relatively
straightforward.
The party supporting the application of federal preliminary
injunction standards to a state claim in federal court would argue that
these standards are incorporated into Rule 65 and therefore are
“procedural,” or at least arguably so. Several courts outside the First

312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471-74.
Id. at 476 (Harlan J., concurring).
28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan J., concurring).
See supra Part I.
See supra Part II.
See supra Part III.
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Circuit have so held. 318 If linked to Rule 65 of the Federal Rules, the
preliminary injunction standards fall squarely within the holding of
Hanna v. Plumer. 319 Thus the federal court may, consistent with the
Erie doctrine, apply federal standards to the movant’s request for a
temporary injunction for its state-based claims. The straightforward
argument is that all matters arising after the commencement of the civil
action relating to the advancement of its resolution are reasonably
classifiable as procedural if covered by a federal rule of civil
procedure. 320
The Supreme Court has defined “procedural” as “the judicial
process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering remedy and redress for disregard or
infraction of them.” 321 A rule “is a truly procedural rule [if] it governs
the in-court dispute resolution processes rather than the dispute that
brought the parties into court . . . .” 322 Thus the application of Rule 65 to
motions for temporary relief would be permissible under the Rules
Enabling Act, Erie, Hanna, and the Constitution.
The Supreme Court has reinforced its “rules conflicts” approach by
noting the rigorous review process for rules under the REA. The
Advisory Committee on the Civil Rules, the Judicial Conference, the
Court itself, and the Congress successively “study and approv[e]” 323
such rules and their amendments. In doing so, these entities make a
“prima facie judgment” that the proposed rule or amendment “in
318. See Ferrero v. Associated Materials, Inc., 923 F.2d 1441, 1448 (11th Cir. 1991)
(citing Hanna and Wright and Miller); Instant Air Freight Co. v. C.F. Air Freight, Inc., 882
F.2d 797, 799 n.4 (3d Cir. 1989) (citing Hanna); Sys. Operations, Inc. v. Scientific Games
Dev. Corp., 555 F.2d 1131, 1141 (3d Cir. 1977) (citing WRIGHT AND MILLER); Curtis 1000,
Inc. v. Youngblade, 878 F. Supp. 1224, 1243 (N.D. Iowa 1995) (citing Hanna and Ferrero);
see generally WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CIVIL 2D §
2943 (1995 with 2011 supplement); WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4513 (1996 with 2011 supplement). Contra Sims
Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 646 (9th Cir. 1988) (Rule 65 is strictly procedural
and does not incorporate the “traditional equitable power of federal courts” to award
preliminary relief). See generally Burbank, supra note 24, at 1320 n.161.
319. 380 U.S. 460 (1965); cf. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008)
(regarding federal preliminary injunction standards, the Supreme Court referred to Rule 65
and federal equity, without specifying their relationship); Charlesbank Equity Fund II v.
Blinds to Go, Inc., 370 F.3d 151, 158 (1st Cir. 2004) (noting that the district court looked to
Rule 65 and “federal equitable principles” as the source for preliminary injunction standards).
320. See Morel v. DaimlerChrysler AG, 565 F.3d 20, 24 (1st Cir. 2009) and cases
therein cited.
321. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
322. Johansen v. E.I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 810 F.2d 1377, 1380 (5th Cir. 1987);
accord Morel, 565 F.3d at 24 (citing Johansen and other precedents).
323. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 6 (1987).
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question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling Act nor
constitutional restrictions.” 324 Furthermore, even if the application of
Rule 65 standards for preliminary relief affects substantive rights, such
impact, the argument goes, only does so “incidentally.” 325
The stumbling block, however, could be the limitation in § 2072(b)
(the Rules Enabling Act): “Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or
modify any substantive right . . . .” 326 The non-moving party would
argue that its substantive rights will be violated if the court enters the
preliminary injunction, which would impact its freedom of action
(whether the injunction is simply prohibitory or affirmative in nature).
To some extent, the Supreme Court has danced around this issue,
partly because it has recognized that the task of drawing the line between
substance and procedure is “a challenging endeavor.” 327 In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit has defined “substantive” as “concerned with the legal
rights of the parties” 328 at all stages of the litigation, not simply the “final
outcome on the merits.” 329 In many cases where a party seeks
preliminary relief, the “final outcome” is determined entirely or “in large
part” at this early stage in the litigation.330 In sharp contrast, other courts
have ruled that granting or denying a preliminary injunction is not
“outcome determinative” under the Erie doctrine. 331
In this sense, what could be more substantive than a court order
limiting freedom of action? Every injunction restricts the freedom of the
person enjoined, which could include liberty or property interests or
324. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471 (footnote omitted) (emphasis added); accord Burlington
Northern R.R. Co, 480 U.S. at. 6 (having passed through or been reported to these bodies, the
proposed rule or amendment has “presumptive validity”).
325. Burlington Northern R.R. Co, 480 U.S. at 5. See also Shady Grove Orthopedic
Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (plurality opinion).
326. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2006).
327. Gasperini v. Ctr. For Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 427 (1996). Compare Paul
D. Carrington, “Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 281
(1989) with Stephen B. Burbank, Hold the Corks: A Comment on Paul Carrington’s
“Substance” and “Procedure” in the Rules Enabling Act, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1012 (1989).
328. Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 645 (9th Cir. 1988) (California
anti-injunction statute precludes the grant of preliminary relief in a federal court civil action
alleging state law claims). But see Compass Bank v. Hartley, 430 F. Supp. 2d 973, 978 n.9
(D. Ariz. 2006) (stating federal standards apply to motions for preliminary injunctions for
state claims because the standards are not “outcome-determinative” under the Erie doctrine);
Sullivan v. Vallejo City Unified School District, 731 F. Supp. 947, 956 (E.D.Cal. 1990)
(stating federal standards apply to Rule 65 motions for preliminary injunctions for state claims
because the standards are not part of the substantive right or “outcome determinative” under
the Erie doctrine).
329. Sims, 836 F.2d at 646.
330. Id. at 647.
331. Supra, note 328 and accompanying text.
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both. Similarly, if the court denies the injunction, the liberty or property
interests of the moving party will be adversely affected. In either case,
the “substantive rights” of the parties will be impacted, contravening the
limitation in § 2072(b).
3.

Non-rules Conflicts

If the conflict between state and federal standards for a temporary
injunction falls on the “non-rules” side of the Hanna analytical
framework, the federal judge would apply a different test. “Non-rules”
conflicts involve disputes where no federal rule promulgated under the
Rules Enabling Act even “arguably” governs the resolution. 332 These
disputes would include conflicts between state law and federal judgemade law. Under this alternative analysis, articulated in Hanna, the
federal standards for preliminary injunctions would be viewed as part of
the judge-made law of equity, not as incorporated into or authorized by
Rule 65. 333
The Supreme Court has identified a two-step process for
determining whether state or federal law applies in these “non-rules”
conflicts. 334 The first step is to determine if state and federal law are
genuinely in conflict, 335 or, in other words, whether the federal law is
broad enough to reach the disputed issue. 336 If not, then the court should
apply both state and federal law. If the conflict is genuine or direct or if
the federal law is broad enough to control the matter before the court,
then the court must determine which law to apply. In making this
determination, the court would evaluate the conflict in terms of the “twin
aims” 337 of Erie: “discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of
inequitable administration of the laws.” 338

332. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 131, at § 5.3.5.
333. Sims Snowboards, 863 F.2d at 646 (stating federal equitable authority to grant
preliminary relief is separate and apart from Rule 65); cf. Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S.
99, 103-06 (1945) (indicating that federal equity is an independent body of law).
334. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 466-69 (1965); cf. Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed
Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini v. Ct. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415
(1996).
335. See Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415 (finding no genuine conflict between a state law
allowing appellate review of damage judgments and the Seventh Amendment.).
336. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010) and cases therein cited.
337. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 468.
338. Id. The “twin aims” of Erie, as the Court ruled in Hanna, replaced the former
“outcome determinative” test of Guar. Trust Co., 326 U.S. 99. Whether the twin aims also
replaced the state/federal interest balancing test of Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec.
Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958), is an open question. See Semtek Int’l, 531 U.S. 497;
Gasperini, 518 U.S. 415.
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The First Circuit Court of Appeals has also applied the “twin goals”
approach even when the federal rule is not broad enough to address the
issue. 339 It has asked whether a court should decline to apply the state
law, even without applying a federal law, because declining would
advance the twin goals of Erie. 340 This ruling seems questionable as the
premise underlying Erie was to prevent federal courts from applying
federal law (thus displacing state law) and thus to discourage forumshopping and to prevent the undermining of state law through its
inequitable administration. It also appears inconsistent with the Rules of
Decision Act, 341 which directs the federal courts to apply state law in the
absence of contrary federal law.
The Court has referred to these two criteria as governing the
“typical, relatively unguided Erie choice.” 342 In other words, if federal
law were more favorable than state law to one of the parties, that party
would choose the federal forum (plaintiffs would commence the action
in or defendants would remove to a federal court). Since an action
asserting state claims would ordinarily be filed and decided in state
court, but for federal jurisdictional statutes that sometimes reach statebased claims, litigating the action in federal court could produce
“inequitable administration of the laws.” 343
As examined earlier, the Massachusetts state and federal criteria for
preliminary injunctions vary sufficiently so that the state and federal
courts, applying their own standards, would reach different results in the
same case involving the same claims and defenses. They would truly be
“outcome determinative,” 344 a test the Supreme Court redefined in
Hanna into the “twin aims” of Erie. If the plaintiff has a choice of state
or federal court, the attorney who plans to seek a preliminary injunction
would choose the forum more favorable to his client, that is, where the
client would have a better chance of securing temporary relief.
As noted earlier, state claims may appear in federal court
complaints by three avenues: (1) diversity jurisdiction; 345 (2)
339. See Godin v. Schencks, 629 F.3d 79, 86 (1st Cir. 2010). In the Supreme Court’s
most recent decision in the Erie/Hanna line of cases, Justice Ginsburg, dissenting, took a
similar approach. Thus even if state law and the federal rule of civil procedure do not conflict
(or the federal rule does not cover the disputed question), the court must then apply the twin
goals of Erie to the state law. Shady Grove Orthopedic Associates, P.A. v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
130 S. Ct. 1431 (2010) (Ginsburg J., dissenting); see also Gasperini, 518 U.S. at 415.
340. See Godin, 629 F.3d at 86.
341. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2006).
342. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
343. Id. at 468.
344. See Guar. Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
345. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); see generally supra note 283.
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supplemental jurisdiction; 346 and (3) general federal question
jurisdiction. 347 In each of these instances, the plaintiff may choose the
state or federal court. If the plaintiff chooses a Massachusetts state
court, the defendant may remove the civil action to the federal court over
the plaintiff’s objection,348 where the standards for preliminary relief are
more favorable. In some instances, though, the plaintiff may seek to
structure the complaint to make the civil action non-removable. 349 After
all, the plaintiff is the master of the complaint.
With federal forums frequently available to both plaintiffs and
defendants in civil actions alleging state-based claims, the divergent
standards for preliminary relief under Massachusetts state and federal
law would undermine the Erie goal of discouraging forum-shopping.
“The general equitable powers of federal courts should not enable a
party suing in diversity to obtain an injunction if state law clearly rejects
the availability of that remedy.” 350 Conversely, the federal “equitable
powers” should not be used to deny a preliminary injunction when state
law would grant it. Indeed the search for the more favorable forum,
state or federal, would be rampant, with plaintiffs, wishing to sue in state
court and remain there, using pleading devices to prevent removal, while
defendants would be seeking to attack such devices so removal could be
effected. 351
The only way to avoid forum-shopping is to apply the state
standards to the motion for preliminary relief whether the civil action is
pending in state or federal court when the claim is based on state law.
The Federal Rules of Evidence have two rules addressing the
Erie/Hanna doctrine. Both rules require the federal courts to follow the
state law of presumptions (Rule 302) and privileges (Rule 501) where
state law provides the rule of decision for “an element of a claim or
defense.” 352 That concept should be applied to motions for preliminary
relief in federal court when state law claims are alleged.
Regarding the other aim of Erie, to prevent the inequitable
administration of the law,353 the varying state and federal standards for
346. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); see generally supra note 284.
347. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006); see generally supra note 285.
348. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006).
349. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980) (joining
non-diverse defendants to prevent removal of the case from the state court to federal court).
350. Sims Snowboards, Inc. v. Kelly, 863 F.2d 643, 647 (9th Cir. 1988).
351. Cf. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp., 444 U.S. at 286 (using lack of personal
jurisdiction of non-diverse defendants to permit removal).
352. FED. R. EVID. 302, 501 (2012)
353. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965).
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preliminary relief would also offend that goal. Given two identical cases
in a state and federal court in Massachusetts involving state-based
claims, the plaintiff, for example, in the state court litigation would have
a better chance of obtaining a temporary injunction under a two or threepronged approach of Packaging Industries (and its progeny) than a
similarly-situated plaintiff in federal court under the four-pronged test
the Supreme Court articulated in Winter 354 and the First Circuit has
applied for almost 30 years. The only difference in the two outcomes is
the forum in which the litigation is pending. That kind of inequality in
the administration of justice is what Erie and its progeny, 355 including
Hanna, have sought to prevent.
4.

Erie/Hanna Avoidance

Federal judges have a variety of tools to avoid this potential
violation of the Erie doctrine without having to address the difficult Erie
questions. Historically, as noted earlier, the Supreme Court has sought
to reconcile the arguably conflicting state and federal law through
interpretation of state and federal law. 356 If such harmony occurs, the
federal court simply applies the state and federal law without having to
resort to the Supremacy Clause of Article VI. But avoidance of the
difficult Erie/Hanna conflicts can be achieved through other
discretionary exercises of federal judicial power. 357
First, with regard to state claims in federal court under the
supplemental jurisdiction statute, 358 the trial court could invoke its
discretionary authority under § 1367(c) of that statute to dismiss the state
claims. 359 Section 1367(c) provides four grounds for discretionary
dismissal of supplemental claims. 360 Three of the grounds are relatively
specific and cabined. The fourth is somewhat indeterminate. The
grounds for dismissal of the state claim (the supplemental claim) may fit
one of the first three, relatively specific paragraphs of § 1367(c). If not,
the trial court could invoke the fourth, more open-ended ground that
allows the court to dismiss a supplemental claim when “in exceptional
circumstances, there are other compelling reasons for declining
354. Winter v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 555 U.S. 7 (2008).
355. E.g., Semtek Int’l Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497 (2001); Gasperini
v. Ctr. for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996).
356. E.g., Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740 (1980).
357. See generally David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV.
543 (1985).
358. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
359. See Id. § 1367(c).
360. Id.
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jurisdiction.” 361 Protecting the integrity of Erie and Hanna, which are
central to our federal system of government, might well qualify as
“exceptional circumstances” and “compelling reasons.” 362
Second, regarding state claims in federal court under the general
federal question jurisdictional statute, the federal judge also has some
discretion to dismiss, taking account of the four factors the Supreme
Court identified as controlling in the Grable decision. 363 In Grable the
Court affirmed the right of a plaintiff to invoke federal question
jurisdiction if its state-based claim has an essential federal element,
which is substantial and disputed, so long as the allocation of such cases
to the federal courts “is consistent with congressional judgment about
the sound division of labor between state and federal courts. . . .” 364
Finally, civil actions brought under the diversity statute present
more challenging issues for the trial judge to exercise discretion to
dismiss the state claims, which ordinarily comprise the entire case.
Federal courts have assumed that if a plaintiff properly alleges grounds
to assert diversity jurisdiction (complete diversity and amount in
controversy), that plaintiff is entitled to be in federal court. Despite that
assumption, the Supreme Court has ordered discretionary dismissals of
state claims in diversity cases under the “abstention” doctrines.365
CONCLUSION
The standards for the grant or denial of a preliminary injunction
overlap in some cases and are considerably different in others when the
action is pending in a Massachusetts state or federal court. While the
Supreme Judicial Court has developed three sets of criteria, depending
on the nature of the case, the First Circuit Court of Appeals, with
Supreme Court guidance, has adopted a four-factor test which it has
employed in virtually every case since 1981, no matter the nature of the
civil action or the parties to it.
In some cases, the state and federal standards for preliminary relief
are nearly identical, while in others they differ dramatically. Such
differences lead to different results depending whether the case is in
361. Id. § 1367(c)(4).
362. Id.
363. Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc., v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005);
accord Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1039 (2013).
364. Id. at 313.
365. E.g., County of Allegheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959) (diversity
jurisdiction); see also Ala. Pub. Serv. Comm’n v. Southern Ry. Co., 341 U.S. 341 (1951)
(diversity and federal question jurisdiction); Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315 (1943)
(same).
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state or federal court, or if in a federal court, whether the judge applies
state or federal standards to the plaintiff’s state-based claims. For
attorneys who have a choice of filing in state or federal court when their
claims are based on state and federal law, they should consider these
differences when seeking preliminary injunctive relief. If their case ends
up in federal court because they have filed there or because the
defendant has removed the action from state to federal court, they then
must seriously consider whether to urge the federal judge to apply state
standards to their state-based claims.
Because the federal courts in Massachusetts have generally applied
federal standards for interlocutory relief in all cases, no matter the source
of the plaintiff’s claim, they have not addressed the critical Erie/Hanna
question whether state standards should apply when the claim in the
federal litigation turns on state substantive law. By finessing the issue
because the objecting party did not raise the question in the trial court or
by stating that the state and federal standards are not “markedly”
different, the First Circuit has avoided the difficulties of the Erie
doctrine. But the state and federal standards for temporary relief are
significantly different in some instances, affecting the result of the
motion for a preliminary injunction.
This Article advances the point that the grant or denial of
preliminary relief impacts the substantive rights of the parties and should
be governed by state standards in federal civil actions alleging state
claims. Because they impact substantive rights, the application of
federal standards to state claims violates the Rules Enabling Act and the
twin aims of the Erie doctrine: to discourage forum-shopping and to
avoid inequitable administration of the laws. The federal courts in
Massachusetts need to confront this critical matter. The United States
Supreme Court could help, first, by drawing a clearer line between
substance and procedure under the Rules Enabling Act, and, second, by
defining “rules of decision” more precisely in the Rules of Decision Act.

